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Abstract. In this paper we study continuous-time stochastic control problems with both
monotone and classical controls motivated by the so-called public good contribution problem.
That is the problem of n economic agents aiming to maximize their expected utility allocating
initial wealth over a given time period between private consumption and irreversible contribu-
tions to increase the level of some public good. We investigate the corresponding social planner
problem and the case of strategic interaction between the agents, i.e. the public good contribution
game. We show existence and uniqueness of the social planner’s optimal policy, we characterize
it by necessary and sufficient stochastic Kuhn-Tucker conditions and we provide its expression
in terms of the unique optional solution of a stochastic backward equation. Similar stochastic
first order conditions prove to be very useful for studying any Nash equilibria of the public good
contribution game. In the symmetric case they allow us to prove (qualitative) uniqueness of
the Nash equilibrium, which we again construct as the unique optional solution of a stochastic
backward equation. We finally also provide a detailed analysis of the so-called free rider effect.
MSC2010 subject classification: 93E20, 91B70, 91A15, 91A25, 60G51
JEL subject classification: C02, C61, C62, C73
Keywords: singular stochastic control, stochastic games, first order conditions for optimality,
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1 Introduction
In economics, a private good is excludable, i.e. its owners can exercise private property rights,
and rivalrous, i.e. consumption by one necessarily prevents that by another. Private goods are,
for example, food, consumable resources (like energy or tap water), but also most durables.
∗Financial support by the German Research Foundation (DFG) via grant Ri 1142-4-2 is gratefully acknowl-
edged.
†Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University, Germany; giorgio.ferrari@uni-bielefeld.de
‡Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University, Germany, and Department of Economic and Fi-
nancial Services, University of Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa; frank.riedel@uni-bielefeld.de
§Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University, Germany; jsteg@uni-bielefeld.de
1
Continuous-Time Public Good Contribution 2
On the other hand, public goods are nonexcludable and nonrivalrous. Clean environment, na-
tional security, academic research and accessible public capital like infrastructure are well known
examples of public goods.
In this paper we consider the problem of n economic agents aiming at maximizing their
expected utility by allocating their initial wealth over a given time period [0, T ], T ∈ (0,∞],
between consumption of a private good and irreversible investment to increase the aggregate level
of some public good. That is, a so-called public good contribution problem. Firstly, we investigate
the corresponding social planner problem, in which a fictitious decision maker takes care of the
consumption choices of all the agents so to maximize the social welfare. Secondly, we consider the
case of strategic interaction between the agents, i.e. a public good contribution game. We model
these classical economic problems in terms of general stochastic control problems in continuous
time with both monotone (possibly singular with respect to the Lebesgue measure, as a function
of time) and classical absolutely continuous control processes. The monotone controls represent
the cumulative contributions into the public good, which are assumed irreversible, whereas the
instantaneous consumption of the private good is modeled as a nonnegative rate with respect
to time.
We tackle the control problem by a first order condition approach that may be thought
of as a stochastic, infinite-dimensional generalization of the classical Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
Our method does not require any Markovian or diffusive hypothesis, and in this sense it
represents a substitute in non-Markovian frameworks for the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equa-
tion. This approach is very powerful in solving general singular control problems as it has
been shown in a quite recent literature. We refer to Bank and Riedel (2001, 2003) for an in-
tertemporal utility maximization problem with Hindy, Huang and Kreps preferences; to Bank
(2005), Chiarolla and Ferrari (2014), Ferrari (2015) and Riedel and Su (2011) for the irre-
versible investment problem of a monopolistic firm with both limited and unlimited resources;
to Chiarolla et al. (2013) for the social planner problem in a market with N firms and limited
resources; to Steg (2012) for a capital accumulation game.
We start analyzing the public good contribution problem by taking the point of view of a
social planner who aims to maximize the expected total utility of the economy under a social
budget constraint. Assuming (forward) prices of the public good and of the private consumption
given by discounted exponential martingales, we prove existence and uniqueness of the social
planner’s optimal policy via a suitable application of Komlo´s’ classical theorem (cf. Komlo´s,
1967), resp. of a generalization due to Kabanov (cf. Lemma 3.5 in Kabanov, 1999; see also the
functional analytic version of Balder, 1990). The optimal investment strategy is completely
characterized by a set of necessary and sufficient stochastic Kuhn-Tucker conditions, which in
turn lead to the identification of a signal process that triggers the optimal monotone control, i.e.
the optimal investment rule into the public good. Such a signal process is the unique solution
of a backward stochastic equation in the spirit of Bank and El Karoui (2004).
We then consider strategic interaction between the agents in our economy and we show that
any Nash equilibrium (if it does exist) satisfies a similar set of first order conditions for optimality.
In equilibrium, the agents act optimally, taking the contribution processes of others as given. In
this sense we restrict our attention to open-loop strategies (see also Back and Paulsen, 2009, and
Steg, 2012) without explicit reactions to deviations from announced (equilibrium) play. Indeed,
as pointed out by Back and Paulsen (2009), there are serious conceptual problems defining a
stochastic continuous-time game of singular controls as ours with more explicit feedback (closed-
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loop) strategies. In a symmetric setting in which agents have utility functions of the same form
and the same initial wealth, we show that there exists a symmetric Nash equilibrium, in which
agents at any time consume the same amount of private good and invest the same amount in
the public good. Further, any equilibrium has the same aggregate public good process as the
symmetric one and the same private good consumption, which is hence a qualitative uniqueness
result. As for the social planner solution, we are able to completely characterize the equilibrium
public good level in terms of the running supremum of an optional process uniquely solving a
backward stochastic equation a` la Bank and El Karoui (2004).
Public goods are extensively studied in economics because of the so-called free rider effect :
agents enjoy the contributions of others but do not take into account others’ benefits when
making their own contributions (see, e.g., Cornes and Sandler, 1996, or Laffont, 1988). This
leads to an inefficiently low voluntary (strategic) supply of the public good. We confirm this
phenomenon in the symmetric version of our general setting (with general concave utilities
and general stochastic price processes): the total expenditure for the public good associated
to the social planner’s symmetric optimal policy is higher than the one related to a symmetric
Nash equilibrium. Moreover, our approach also allows a detailed analysis of the degree of free
riding in a more specific symmetric setting, where utilities are of Cobb-Douglas type and prices
are driven by Le´vy uncertainty. Indeed, in such a case we can find the explicit forms of the
social planner’s optimal policy and of the Nash equilibrium so to compare their public good
contribution processes. However, such a detailed comparison seems very hard to obtain in the
general setting (see the discussion after Proposition 5.1 below).
From the applied point of view, our model differs from the existing related literature1 on
public goods for two main aspects. First of all, we consider a stochastic, dynamic model of
intertemporal investment choice with general concave utilities, not necessarily separable, which
thus allow us to account for cross effects between the public and the private good. To the best
of our knowledge, this is a novelty with respect to the classical models in which usually the
investor has a quasilinear utility2 and can choose how to divide a budget given in each period
between instantaneous private consumption and public good investment. Secondly, we take
into account irreversibility of the investments (by modeling the public good contributions as
monotone controls) which together with uncertainty typically induces reluctance to invest. We
are able to analyze the interplay of this dynamic effect with free riding. Interestingly it is not
necessarily the case that uncertainty and irreversibility of public good contributions aggravate
the degree of free-riding. We indeed explicitly evaluate the free rider effect in a symmetric Black-
Scholes setting with Cobb-Douglas utilities and we show that uncertainty and irreversibility of
public good provisions do not affect the degree of free-riding.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up the model. In Section 3 we consider
the social planner problem, proving existence and uniqueness of its solution and introducing
the stochastic Kuhn-Tucker conditions for optimality. The public good contribution game is
addressed in Section 4, whereas explicit results are obtained in Section 5. Finally we refer to
Appendix A for some technical proofs.
1See, e.g., the classical work of Varian (1994) and the recent papers by Battaglini et al. (2014),
Wang and Ewald (2010) and Yeung and Petrosyan (2013) and references therein.
2A quasilinear utility is an additively separable utility function which is linear in one of its arguments and
concave in the others.
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2 The Model
We consider a continuous-time stochastic economy with a finite number n ≥ 1 of agents over a
fixed time horizon 0 < T ≤ ∞. Each agent, indexed by i = 1, . . . , n, chooses how to allocate
his initial wealth wi > 0 between private consumption xi and arbitrary but nondecreasing
cumulative contributions Ci to increase the level of some public good. We assume a continuous
revelation of information about an exogenous source of uncertainty and we allow the agents to
condition their decisions on the accumulated information. Formally, let (Ω,F , {Ft}t∈[0,T ], P ) be
a filtered probability space satisfying the usual conditions of right-continuity and completeness.
For the moment we do not make any Markovian assumption.
One may think that the agents are financed entirely by their labor or by holding a portfolio
of financial instruments. Hence they are part of a more complex financial market that, however,
we do not model explicitly. At the initial time each agent can buy one unit of the private good
for contingent delivery at time t ∈ [0, T ] and state ω ∈ Ω at forward price ψx(ω, t). Analogously,
the contingent state-price for the contribution to the public good is ψc(ω, t). Both ψx and ψc
are strictly positive (more technical conditions are listed in Assumption 2 below). The forward
price of an investment plan (xi, Ci) is therefore
Ψ(xi, Ci) := E
[∫ T
0
ψx(t)x
i(t)dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dC
i(t)
]
, (2.1)
where (xi, Ci) can be chosen in the nonempty, convex budget-feasible set
Bwi :=
{
(xi, Ci) : Ω× [0, T ] 7→ R2+ optional, s.t. Ci is right-continuous
and nondecreasing with Ci(0−) = 0 P -a.s., and Ψ(xi, Ci) ≤ wi
}
.
(2.2)
Remark 2.1. The assumption that (xi, Ci) is optional is not more restrictive than adaptedness.
Indeed, adaptedness and right-continuity of Ci imply optionality, cf. footnote 3. If xi is only
adapted, then its optional projection oxi satisfies oxit = x
i
t P -a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ] and hence
yields the same cost in (2.1) and utility in (2.3) below thanks to Tonelli’s Theorem.
Here Ψ(xi, Ci) ≤ wi defines therefore the budget constraint of agent i. Notice that we can
have jumps as well as singular increases (with respect to the Lebesgue measure) in Ci. This
means that agents can contribute both in lumps at certain times and continuously, the latter
even not necessarily in rates. Recalling that each t 7→ Ci(ω, t) is a.s. nondecreasing, we in fact
denote by
∫ T
0 (·) dCi(t) the Lebesgue-Stieltjes integral
∫
[0,T ](·) dCi(t) throughout, to include a
possible initial jump of the contribution, corresponding to a point mass Ci(0) > 0 of the random
Borel measure dCi at time t = 0.
The agents are assumed to derive some expected, time-separable utility from the private good
and the aggregate public good process C :=
∑
i∈{1,...,n}C
i. Given a combination of strategies
from
∏n
i=1 Bwi , agent i’s utility is
U i(xi, Ci;C−i) := E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0
r(s) dsui(xi(t), C(t)) dt
]
, (2.3)
Continuous-Time Public Good Contribution 5
where C−i :=
∑
j∈{1,...,n}\i C
j, r is an exogenous stochastic discount factor and ui : R2+ 7→ R+
is an instantaneous utility function. In the economic literature on public good contribution it
is customary to assume quasilinear utilities (see, e.g., the early paper by Varian, 1994, and the
very recent one by Battaglini et al., 2014). Here, instead, we work with general concave utilities,
allowing to account for cross effects between the public and the private good.
Assumption 1.
i. ui is increasing and strictly concave on R2+, as well as twice continuously differentiable
on the open cone R2++, with negative definite Hessian. Moreover, it satisfies the Inada
conditions
lim
x↓0
uix(x, c) = +∞ and lim
x↑∞
uix(x, c) = 0
for any c > 0.
ii. The family
(
e−
∫ t
0
r(ω,s) dsui(xi(ω, t), C(ω, t)), (x,C) ∈
n∏
i=1
Bwi
)
is P ⊗ dt-uniformly inte-
grable.
Assumption 2.
i. The adapted process ψc := {ψc(t), t ∈ [0, T ]} is right-continuous and such that ψc(t) =
e−
∫ t
0
rc(s)dsEc(t) a.s. for every t ∈ [0, T ], with some uniformly bounded and strictly positive
process rc = {rc(t), t ∈ [0, T ]} and some exponential martingale Ec := {Ec(t), t ∈ [0, T ]}.
Moreover, if T =∞, one has ψc(T ) = 0 a.s.
ii. The adapted process ψx := {ψx(t), t ∈ [0, T ]} is right-continuous and such that ψx(t) =
e−
∫ t
0 rx(s)dsEx(t) a.s. for every t ∈ [0, T ], with some uniformly bounded and strictly positive
process rx := {rx(t), t ∈ [0, T ]} and some exponential martingale Ex := {Ex(t), t ∈ [0, T ]}.
iii. The optional, strictly positive process r := {r(t), t ∈ [0, T ]} is uniformly bounded.3
Under Assumptions 1 and 2 the payoff in (2.3) is well defined and finite for any i = 1, . . . , n.
3A stochastic process X is:
(a) optional if it is measurable with respect to the optional sigma-field O on Ω× [0, T ] generated, e.g., by the
right-continuous adapted processes;
(b) lower-semicontinuous in expectation if for any stopping time τ one has lim infn↑∞ E[X(τn)] ≥ E[X(τ )],
whenever {τn}n∈N is a monotone sequence of stopping times converging to τ ;
(c) of class (D) if {X(τ ), τ a stopping time} defines a uniformly integrable family of random variables on
(Ω,F , P ).
We refer the reader to Dellacherie and Meyer (1978), among others, for further details.
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Remark 2.2.
i. The Inada conditions of Assumption 1.i. guarantee that there will be an interior solution
for optimal private consumption.
ii. Note that since ui is concave in c, by Assumption 1.ii. e−
∫ t
0
r(s) dsuic(x(t), C(t)) is P ⊗ dt-
integrable for any (x,C) ∈∏ni=1 Bwi such that C(0) > 0 a.s.
iii. Thanks to the budget constraint in (2.2), when T <∞ one can easily adapt the arguments
in the proof of Lemma 2.1 in Bank and Riedel (2001) to show that Assumption 1.ii. is
satisfied if
(a) for some α, β ∈ (0, 1) one has ui(x, c) ≤ const.(1 + xα + cβ), and
(b)
E−1x ∈ Lpˆ(P ) and E−1c ∈ Lqˆ(P )
for some pˆ > α1−α and qˆ >
β
1−β , with Ex and Ec as in Assumption 2.
iv. Right-continuity of ψc follows already from taking a right-continuous version of the ex-
ponential martingale Ec. By assuming that Ec has a last element, it is uniformly inte-
grable and hence of class (D) (see Revuz and Yor, 1999, Theorem 3.2), cf. footnote 3;
the same holds then for ψc. Furthermore, ψc is a supermartingale under Assumption 2.i.
and hence lower semicontinuous in expectation also from the left. Indeed, E
[
ψc(u)
∣∣Ft] ≤
e−
∫ t
0 rc(s)dsE
[Ec(u)∣∣Ft] = ψc(t). The same remarks apply to ψx.
v. It is easy to see that Assumption 2.i. and 2.ii. are satisfied, for example, by the classical
benchmark cases of geometric Brownian motions (for discount factor rc suitably chosen to
have ψc(T ) = 0 a.s. when T = +∞).
vi. More generally, in Sections 3 and 4 below we can allow for a random field ui : Ω×[0, T ]×R2+
of instantaneous utilities such that for any given (x,C) ∈ ∏ni=1 Bwi , the process (ω, t) 7→
ui(ω, t, x(ω, t), C(ω, t)) is progressively measurable. Then the properties in Assumption
1.i. are imposed for any given (ω, t) ∈ Ω × [0, T ] on the mapping (x, c) 7→ ui(ω, t, x, c),
while in ii. just the argument (ω, t) needs to be added.
3 The Social Planner Problem
We start our analysis by studying a social planner problem for the economy described in Section
2. Throughout this section, denote by (x,C) a vector of investment processes valued in R2n+ with
components (x1, . . . , xn, C1, . . . , Cn) and introduce the nonempty, convex, social budget-feasible
set
Bw :=
{
(x,C) : Ω× [0, T ] 7→ R2n+ optional, s.t. Ci is right-continuous and
nondecreasing with Ci(0−) = 0 P -a.s., i = 1, . . . , n, and
n∑
i=1
Ψ(xi, Ci) ≤ w
} (3.1)
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with w :=
∑n
i=1w
i. We say that (x,C) is admissible if (x,C) ∈ Bw. Suppose that there
exists a fictitious social planner aiming to maximize the aggregate expected utility by allocating
efficiently the available initial wealth. This amounts to solving the optimization problem with
value
VSP (w) := sup
(x,C)∈Bw
USP (x,C) := sup
(x,C)∈Bw
n∑
i=1
γiU i(xi, Ci;C−i) (3.2)
with U i(xi, Ci;C−i) as in (2.3) and for given positive weights γi, i = 1, . . . , n, such that∑n
i=1 γ
i = 1.
Theorem 3.1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2 there exists (x∗, C∗) ∈ Bw which solves the social
planner problem (3.2). (x∗, C∗) with C∗ =
∑n
i=1 C
i
∗ is unique up to indistinguishability.
Proof. The proof is organized in three steps.
Step 1. In this first step we let T < ∞. Recall that ψx(t) = e−
∫ t
0 rx(s)dsEx(t) and ψc(t) =
e−
∫ t
0 rc(s)dsEc(t) for some strictly positive and uniformly bounded processes rx and rc, and for
some exponential martingales Ex and Ec (cf. Assumption 2.i.). Let E˜c and E˜x be the expecta-
tions under the measures P˜c and P˜x on FT with Radon-Nikodym derivative Ec(T ) and Ex(T ),
respectively, with respect to P . Since Ex(T ) > 0 and Ec(T ) > 0 a.s., the measure P is equivalent
both to P˜c and P˜x. Also, from now on we shall set dµx := dP˜x ⊗ dt/T .
Let {(xm, Cm)}m∈N ⊂ Bw be a maximizing sequence; that is, a sequence of investment plans
such that
lim
m→∞
n∑
i=1
γiU i(xim, C
i
m;C
−i
m ) = VSP .
Notice that for any i = 1, . . . , n
w ≥ E
[∫ T
0
ψx(t)x
i
m(t)dt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 rx(s)dsE[Ex(T )|Ft]xim(t)dt
]
= E
[
Ex(T )
∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0
rx(s)dsxim(t)dt
]
≥ K1E˜x
[∫ T
0
xim(t)dt
]
, (3.3)
where the uniform boundedness of rx implies the last step with some constant K1 > 0. Hence
each {xim}m∈N, i = 1, . . . , n, is L1-bounded as sequence of random variables on the probability
space (Ω× [0, T ],O, dµx), where O is the optional σ-algebra. Analogously,
w ≥ E
[∫ T
0
ψc(t)dC
i(t)
]
= E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 rc(s)dsE[Ec(T )|Ft] dCi(t)
]
= E
[
Ec(T )
∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0
rc(s)dsdCi(t)
]
= E˜c
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0
rc(s)dsdCi(t)
]
≥ K2E˜c[Ci(T )],
where the second equality follows from Theorem 1.33 in Jacod (1979), and with K2 > 0 a
suitable constant implied by the uniform boundedness of rc.
Hence by Komlo´s’ theorem (see Komlo´s, 1967, for its standard formulation and Kabanov,
1999, Lemma 3.5, for a version of Komlo´s’ theorem for optional random measures4), for every
4An optional random measure on [0, T ] is simply a random variable ν valued in the space of nonnegative Borel
measures on [0, T ] (endowed with the topology of weak*-convergence) such that the process ν(ω, t) := ν(ω, [0, t]) is
adapted. Our admissible public good contribution processes are the cumulative distributions of optional random
measures, being adapted, right-continuous, and nonnegative.
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i = 1, . . . , n there exist two subsequences {x˜im}m∈N ⊂ {xim}m∈N and {C˜im}m∈N ⊂ {Cim}m∈N and
a dµx-integrable and optional process x
i
∗ and some optional random measure dC
i
∗, i = 1, . . . , n,
such that, as k ↑ ∞,
Xik(t) :=
1
k + 1
k∑
m=0
x˜im(t)→ xi∗(t), dµx-a.e., (3.4)
and
Iik(t) :=
1
k + 1
k∑
m=0
C˜im(t)→ Ci∗(t) for every point of continuity of Ci∗(·) and t = T, P˜c-a.s.
(3.5)
From now on, with a slight abuse of notation, we will denote by Ci∗ as well the right-continuous
modification of Ci∗. Notice that having limk→∞ I
i
k(t) = C
i
∗(t) P˜c-a.s. for every point of continuity
of Ci∗(·) and for t = T (cf. (3.5)) means that the sequence of measures dIik(ω, ·) on [0, T ] converges
weakly to dCi∗(ω, ·) P˜c-a.e. ω; that is (see, e.g., Billingsley (1986))
lim
k→∞
∫ T
0
f(t)dIik(t) =
∫ T
0
f(t)dCi∗(t), P˜c − a.s., (3.6)
for every bounded and dCi∗-a.e. continuous function f . We now claim that the Komlo´s’ limit
(x∗, C∗) := (x
1
∗, . . . , x
n
∗ , C
1
∗ , . . . , C
n
∗ ) belongs to Bw and that it is optimal for the social planner’s
problem (3.2). Indeed, (Xk, Ik) := (X
1
k , . . . ,X
n
k , I
1
k , . . . , I
n
k ) ∈ Bw by convexity of Bw. Moreover
(3.4), (3.6) and Fatou’s Lemma imply
w ≥ lim inf
k→∞
n∑
i=1
E
[∫ T
0
ψx(t)X
i
k(t)dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dI
i
k(t)
]
= lim inf
k→∞
n∑
i=1
(
E˜x
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0
rx(s)dsXik(t)dt
]
+ E˜c
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0
rc(s)dsdIik(t)
])
≥
n∑
i=1
(
E˜x
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 rx(s)dsxi∗(t)dt
]
+ E˜c
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 rc(s)dsdCi∗(t)
])
(3.7)
=
n∑
i=1
E
[∫ T
0
ψx(t)x
i
∗(t)dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dC
i
∗(t)
]
;
that is, (x∗, C∗) ∈ Bw. Recall now that Px ∼ P and Pc ∼ P . Then (3.5) and (3.4) also hold
P -a.s. and dP ⊗ dt-a.e., respectively (in particular Iik(t) → Ci∗(t) dt-a.e., P -a.s.), and therefore
we may write
n∑
i=1
γiU i(xi∗, C
i
∗;C
−i
∗ ) = lim
k→∞
n∑
i=1
γiU i(Xik, I
i
k; I
−i
k ) = VSP
by the uniform integrability assumed in Assumption 1.ii. and because (Xk, Ik) is also a maxi-
mizing sequence by concavity of each U i. Hence (x∗, C∗) is optimal.
The above arguments also extend to the infinite horizon case T = +∞ as it is shown in the next
step.
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Step 2. We only sketch the proof, since some of the arguments are similar to those employed
in Step 1. Let T = +∞ and {(xm, Cm)}m∈N be an admissible maximizing sequence for VSP . For
each K ∈ N we can apply the construction of Step 1 to the interval [0,K] to obtain measures
P˜Kx and P˜
K
c equivalent to P on (Ω,FK) and limit processes x
K,i
∗ and optional random measures
dCK,i∗ such that the convergence (3.4) resp. (3.5) holds on [0,K]. As the convergence occurs also
dP ⊗ dt a.e., resp. P -a.s., we can aggregate the limits {xK,i∗ }K∈N and {dCK,i∗ }K∈N consistently
to optional processes xi∗ and optional measures dC
i
∗ while maintaining convergence. Now we
can apply the budget estimate (3.7) on each [0,K], let K → ∞ and conclude by monotone
convergence that (x∗, C∗) ∈ Bw. Optimality obtains exactly as in Step 1.
Step 3. Finally, uniqueness of (x∗, C∗) up to indistinguishability follows as usual (both in
the finite and in the infinite time-horizon case) from strict concavity of the utility functions ui,
i = 1, . . . , n, and from convexity of Bw.
We now aim to characterize the social planner’s optimal policy by means of a set of first
order conditions for optimality. These conditions may be thought of as a stochastic, infinite
dimensional generalization of the classical Kuhn-Tucker method and they have been used in
diverse instances to solve singular stochastic control problems of the monotone follower type (cf.
the overview in Section 1).
For any (x,C) ∈ Bw and for some Lagrange multiplier λ > 0, define the Lagrangian functional
of problem (3.2) as
Lw(x,C;λ) :=
n∑
i=1
γiE
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) dsui(xi(t), C(t)) dt
]
+ λ
{
w − E
[∫ T
0
ψx(t)x(t)dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dC(t)
]}
,
where again x :=
∑n
i=1 x
i and C :=
∑n
i=1 C
i. Moreover, let T be the set of all (Ft)-stopping
times with values in [0, T ] a.s. and denote by ∇cLw the Lagrangian functional’s supergradient
with respect to the aggregated public good contribution; that is, the unique optional process
such that
∇cLw(x,C;λ)(τ) := E
[∫ T
τ
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γi uic(x
i(t), C(t)) dt
∣∣∣∣ Fτ]− λψc(τ)
for any τ ∈ T . ∇cLw(x,C;λ)(τ) may be interpreted as the future marginal expected utility
net of the marginal contribution cost, which the social planner would incur by an infinitesimal
investment into the public good at time τ ∈ T when the investment plan is (x,C) ∈ Bw and the
shadow value of the budget is λ.
On the other hand, additional consumption of the private good xi affects marginal utility
only at those times at which consumption actually occurs, thus leading to
∇xLw(x,C;λ)(t) := γie−
∫ t
0 r(s)dsuix(x
i(t), C(t))− λψx(t), t ∈ [0, T ].
Remark 3.2. Following Remark 3.1 in Bank and Riedel (2001), ∇cLw(x,C;λ) is the Riesz rep-
resentation of the Lagrangian gradient at C. More precisely, for any arbitrary but fixed λ > 0,
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define ∇cLw(x,C;λ) as the optional projection of the product-measurable process
Φ(ω, t) :=
∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
0 r(ω,u) du
n∑
i=1
γi uic(ω, x
i(ω, s), C(ω, s)) ds − λψc(ω, t)
for ω ∈ Ω and t ∈ [0, T ]. Hence∇cLw(x,C;λ) is uniquely determined up to P -indistinguishability
and it holds
E
{∫ T
0
∇cLw(x,C;λ)dC(t)
}
= E
{∫ T
0
Φ(t)dC(t)
}
for all admissible C (cf. Jacod, 1979, Theorem 1.33).
Proposition 3.3. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. An admissible policy (x∗, C∗) is optimal for
the social planner’s problem (3.2) if and only if there exists a Lagrange multiplier λ∗ > 0 such
that the following first order conditions (FOCs) hold true
E
[∫ T
0
ψx(t)x∗(t)dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dC∗(t)
]
= w,
E
[∫ T
τ
e−
∫ t
0
r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuic(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t)) dt
∣∣∣∣ Fτ] ≤ λ∗ψc(τ) P -a.s. ∀ τ ∈ T ,
E
[∫ T
0
(
E
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
0 r(u) du
n∑
i=1
γiuic(x
i
∗(s), C∗(s)) ds
∣∣∣∣ Ft]− λ∗ψc(t))dC∗(t)] = 0,
γie−
∫ t
0 r(s)dsuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t)) ≤ λ∗ψx(t) P ⊗ dt-a.e., with equality on {xi∗ > 0}.
(3.8)
The proof of Proposition 3.3 is given in Appendix A, Section A.1. It generalizes that of
Theorem 3.2 in Bank and Riedel (2001) to the present setting of a multidimensional optimal
consumption problem with both classical and monotone controls and it is obtained by suitably
adapting the proof of the classical Kuhn-Tucker conditions to the stochastic, infinite-dimensional
setting. Indeed, concavity of the utility functions ui, i = 1, . . . , n, yields sufficiency, whereas the
proof of the necessity part is more delicate. We linearize the original problem (3.2) around its
optimal solution (x∗, C∗) and then show that (x∗, C∗) solves the linearized problem as well. It is
then proved that any solution to the linearized problem (and therefore (x∗, C∗) as well) satisfies
some flat-off conditions as the third and the fourth of (3.8).
Notice that because of the Inada condition limx↓0 u
i
x(x, c) = ∞ (cf. Assumption 1.i.), the
fourth one of (3.8) must be always binding, i.e.
γie−
∫ t
0
r(s)dsuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t)) = λ∗ψx(t) P ⊗ dt-a.e.
Thus, recalling that (x, c) 7→ ui(x, c) is strictly concave (see again Assumption 1) and denoting
by gi(·, c) the inverse of uix(·, c), we may write
xi∗(t) = g
i
(λ∗
γi
e
∫ t
0 r(s)dsψx(t), C∗(t)
)
P ⊗ dt-a.e. (3.9)
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Then, by plugging (3.9) into (3.8) we obtain the equivalent formulation of the first order condi-
tions for optimality
E
[∫ T
0
ψx(t)
n∑
i=1
gi
(λ∗
γi
e
∫ t
0 r(s)dsψx(t), C∗(t)
)
dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dC∗(t)
]
= w,
E
[∫ T
τ
e−
∫ t
0
r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γihi
(λ∗
γi
e
∫ t
0
r(u)duψx(t), C∗(t)
)
dt
∣∣∣∣ Fτ] ≤ λ∗ψc(τ) P -a.s. ∀ τ ∈ T ,
E
[∫ T
0
(
E
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
0 r(u) du
n∑
i=1
γihi
(λ∗
γi
e
∫ s
0 r(u)duψx(s), C∗(s)
)
ds
∣∣∣∣ Ft]− λ∗ψc(t))dC∗(t)] = 0,
(3.10)
with hi(ψ, c) := uic(g
i(ψ, c), c). In Lemma A.2 in the appendix some properties of hi are proved.
Although the first order conditions of Proposition 3.3 (or those in (3.10)) completely charac-
terize the optimal policy, they are not binding at all times and so they cannot be directly used to
determine C∗ and consequently x∗ by (3.9). As usual in the literature on stochastic control prob-
lems with monotone controls (see, e.g., Chiarolla and Haussmann (1994), El Karoui and Karatzas
(1991), Karatzas (1981), Karatzas and Shreve (1984) as classical references), the optimal policy
consists of keeping the controlled process close to some barrier (which is the free boundary of an
associated optimal stopping problem in a Markovian setting) in a ‘minimal way’ (i.e. according
to a Skorokhod’s reflection principle). Here we derive the social planner’s optimal investment
into the public good C∗ in terms of the running supremum of an index process representing the
desirable value of investment or consumption the agents would like to have. Mathematically,
such an index process is the optional solution of a stochastic backward equation in the spirit
of Bank-El Karoui (cf. Bank and El Karoui (2004), Theorem 1 and Theorem 3) and it may be
represented in terms of the value functions of a family of optimal stopping problems (see also
Bank and Fo¨llmer (2003) for further details and applications).
The following result is proved in Appendix A, Section A.3.
Proposition 3.4. Define for every i = 1, . . . , n gi(·, c) as the inverse of uix(·, c), as well as
hi(ψ, c) := uic(g(ψ, c), c) for any ψ, c > 0. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and suppose that the
Inada conditions limc↓0 h
i(ψ, c) = +∞ and limc↑∞ hi(ψ, c) = 0 are satisfied. Then for any given
set of weights {γi}i=1,...,n and for any given Lagrange multiplier λ > 0 there exists a unique (up to
indistinguishability) optional, upper right-continuous process l∗ solving the stochastic backward
equation
E
[∫ T
τ
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γihi
(
λ
γi
e
∫ t
0 r(u)duψx(t), sup
τ≤u≤t
l(u)
)
dt
∣∣∣∣ Fτ] = λψc(τ)1{τ<T} (3.11)
for any stopping time τ ∈ [0, T ] subject to l∗T = 0, P -a.s.
Notice that differently to those on ui (cf. Assumption 1), Inada conditions on hi do not have
an immediate economic interpretation. However these requirements have a clear mathematical
importance, as they suffice to show existence of a unique optional, upper right-continuous l∗
solving (3.11) (see Section A.3 of Appendix A for details).
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Theorem 3.5. Under the assumptions of Proposition 3.4, (x1∗, . . . , x
n
∗ , C
1
∗ , . . . , C
n
∗ ) solves the
social planner’s problem (3.2) if and only if
C∗(t) =
∑n
i=1 C
i
∗(t) = sup0≤u≤t l
∗(u) ∨ 0,
xi∗(t) = g
i
(
λ∗
γi
ψx(t), C∗(t)
)
, i = 1, . . . , n,
(3.12)
where l∗ is the unique solution of (3.11) for a suitable Lagrange multiplier λ∗ > 0 such that∑n
i=1Ψ(x
i
∗, C
i
∗) = w.
Proof. To show optimality of (x∗(t), C∗(t)) as in (3.12) it suffices to verify that it is admissible
and satisfies the (necessary and) sufficient first order conditions (3.10). By Theorem 33 in
Chapter IV of Dellacherie and Meyer (1978), C∗ as in (3.12) is progressively measurable since l
∗
is optional; also, it has right-continuous sample paths since l∗ is upper right-continuous. Hence
it is optional. On the other hand, xi∗, i = 1, . . . , n, is optional and positive since g
i is continuous
and positive. Moreover, for any τ ∈ [0, T ) we have
E
[∫ T
τ
e−
∫ t
0
r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γihi
(λ∗
γi
e
∫ t
0
r(u)duψx(t), sup
0≤u≤t
l∗(u) ∨ 0
)
dt
∣∣∣∣ Fτ]
≤ E
[∫ T
τ
e−
∫ t
0
r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γihi
(λ∗
γi
e
∫ t
0
r(u)duψx(t), sup
τ≤u≤t
l∗(u)
)
dt
∣∣∣∣ Fτ] = λ∗ψc(τ), (3.13)
where the first inequality follows from the fact that c 7→ hi(ψ, c) is strictly decreasing (see Lemma
A.2), whereas (3.11) implies the last equality. On the other hand, if τ ∈ T is a time of investment,
i.e. such that C∗(τ +ε)−C∗(τ−) > 05 for any ε > 0, we have sup0≤u≤t l∗(u)∨0 = supτ≤u≤t l∗(u)
on (τ, T ] and equality holds in (3.13). Since those times carry the measure dC∗, the third line
of (3.10) is satisfied as well (note that dC∗ does not charge [T ] by l
∗
T = 0).
We now argue that the required λ∗ to satisfy the budget constraint
∑n
i=1Ψ(x
i
∗, C
i
∗) = w
exists. Indeed, by Theorem 3.1 we know a priori that a solution (x∗(t), C∗(t)) to our control
problem exists, and by necessity in Proposition 3.3 there is a corresponding λ∗. That solution
satisfies also the FOCs (3.10), of which we now ignore the first line. Then we have FOCs for a
control problem without budget constraint, but with linear investment cost λ∗ψc dC and profit
stream
H(ω, t, c) := e−
∫ t
0 r(ω,s) ds
n∑
i=1
γi
∫ c
0
hi
(λ∗
γi
e
∫ t
0 r(ω,u)duψx(ω, t), y
)
dy,
i.e., the problem of maximizing
E
[∫ T
0
H(t, Ct) dt−
∫ T
0
λ∗ψc(t) dCt
]
over C adapted, right-continuous and nondecreasing with C(0−) = 0, P -a.s. This latter problem
has a unique solution (by strict concavity) given by (x∗(t), C∗(t)) since that solves the sufficient
FOCs in (3.10). On the other hand, our solution from (3.12) (now with λ∗ from Proposition
5That is, τ is a time of increase for C∗(ω, ·).
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3.3) also solves those FOCs, as verified above. Hence, the latter solution must coincide with
(x∗(t), C∗(t)) from Theorem 3.1 and thus be budget-feasible.
Finally, necessity follows from the uniqueness established in Theorem 3.1.
Remark 3.6. The process l∗ may be found numerically by backward induction on a discretized
version of problem (3.11) (see Bank and Fo¨llmer (2003), Section 4). In some cases, when T =
+∞, (3.11) has a closed form solution as in the case of a Cobb-Douglas utility function (see
Section 5 below).
4 The Public Good Contribution Game
In Section 3 we have taken the point of view of a fictitious social planner aiming to efficiently
maximize the social welfare. Here we aim to study strategic interaction between the agents of
our economy. Therefore assume from now on n > 1.
Determining agent i’s optimal choice of a strategy against a given process C−i specifying
aggregate contributions by the opponents amounts to solving the stochastic control problem
with value function
V i(C−i) := sup
(xi,Ci)∈B
wi
U i(xi, Ci;C−i), i = 1, . . . , n, (4.1)
where Bwi and U i are as in (2.2) and (2.3), respectively. The description of the game is completed
by the introduction of a standard Nash equilibrium concept.
Definition 4.1. (xˆ1, . . . , xˆn, Cˆ1, . . . , Cˆn) is a Nash equilibrium if for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (xˆi, Cˆi) ∈
Bwi and U i(xˆi, Cˆi, Cˆ−i) = V i(Cˆ−i).
While this equilibrium notion does not limit the ability of any agent to optimize against
given strategies of the others, it does limit the extent of dynamic interaction that can take
place. Although agents do react to the evolving exogenous uncertainty, they take the contribu-
tion processes of others as given and do not react to deviations from announced (equilibrium)
play. Therefore, one might term such an equilibrium as one in precommitment strategies. Un-
fortunately there are serious conceptual difficulties in defining a related game with more explicit
feedback strategies as argued by Back and Paulsen (2009), which is why we consider simple Nash
equilibria here. Besides these conceptual problems, the choice of open-loop strategies we pro-
vide here can be justified at the modeling stage if agents are not able to observe the opponents’
investments in the public good.
As in the social planner’s case we shall first characterize solutions of the best reply problems
(4.1) by means of a stochastic Kuhn-Tucker approach. The next Proposition accomplishes this.
Its proof may be obtained by adopting arguments similar to those employed to prove Proposition
3.3 and therefore we omit its proof for the sake of brevity.
Proposition 4.2. Let Cˆ−i be given and Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then (xˆi, Cˆi) ∈ Bwi attains
V i(Cˆ−i) (cf. (4.1)) if and only if there exists a Lagrange multiplier λˆi > 0 such that the following
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first order conditions hold true
E
[∫ T
0
ψx(t)xˆ
i(t)dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dCˆ
i(t)
]
= wi,
E
[∫ T
τ
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) dsuic(xˆ
i(t), Cˆ(t)) dt
∣∣∣∣ Fτ] ≤ λˆiψc(τ) P -a.s. ∀ τ ∈ T ,
E
[∫ T
0
(
E
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
0
r(u) duuic(xˆ
i(s), Cˆ(s)) ds
∣∣∣∣ Ft]− λˆiψc(t))dCˆi(t)] = 0,
e−
∫ t
0
r(u) duuix(xˆ
i(t), Cˆ(t)) ≤ λˆiψx(t) P ⊗ dt-a.e., with equality on {xˆi > 0}.
(4.2)
Again, the Inada conditions (cf. Assumption 1.i.) imply that the fourth one of (4.2) is always
binding. Hence, we may equivalently rewrite (4.2) as
E
[∫ T
0
ψx(t)g
i(λˆie
∫ t
0
r(s) dsψx(t), Cˆ(t)) dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dCˆ
i(t)
]
= wi,
E
[∫ T
τ
e−
∫ t
0
r(s) dshi(λˆie
∫ t
0
r(s) dsψx(t), Cˆ(t)) dt
∣∣∣∣ Fτ] ≤ λˆiψc(τ) P -a.s. ∀ τ ∈ T ,
E
[∫ T
0
(
E
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
0 r(u) duhi(λˆie
∫ s
0 r(u) duψx(s), Cˆ(s)) ds
∣∣∣∣ Ft]− λˆiψc(t))dCˆi(t)] = 0,
(4.3)
where again hi(ψ, c) := uic(g
i(ψ, c), c) with gi(·, c) the inverse of uix(·, c).
A more explicit characterization of a Nash equilibrium (if it exists) in the spirit of Theorem
3.5 for the social planner’s optimal policy seems difficult to obtain in the generality of our public
good contribution game. In fact the first order conditions in (4.3) are mutually interconnected
and this leads to a daunting (infinite-dimensional) fixed point problem.
However, when all the agents have the same utility function and the same initial wealth,
we can make quite clear predictions by our approach. We can now establish existence of a
symmetric Nash equilibrium in which (xˆi, Cˆi) = (xˆ1, Cˆ1) for all i = 1, . . . , n. We can relate
all other equilibria to the symmetric one, giving us also a qualitative uniqueness. Therefore
we exploit the fact that in the symmetric case the first order conditions of Proposition 4.2
are the same for all agents (including λˆi) and they have a similar form as those for the social
planner with equal weights (up to some factor n). Nevertheless, we cannot transform equilibrium
determination into a control problem. For these results we make the additional assumption that
uxc is nonnegative, which holds for instance in the standard setting of quasilinear (i.e., additively
separable) utility in the economics literature or also for Cobb-Douglas utilities considered below.
Theorem 4.3. Let Assumption 2 hold and suppose that all agents have the same initial wealth
wi = w/n > 0 and the same utility function ui ≡ u satisfying Assumption 1. Further as-
sume uxc ≥ 06. Then there exists a symmetric Nash equilibrium (xˆ1, . . . , xˆn, Cˆ1, . . . , Cˆn) with
6Mathematically, the utility function u is supermodular (see Topkis (1978)). Economically, this means that
the private and the public goods are complements. Two goods are complements if the increase of a good’s demand
corresponds to a decrease in the price of the other good.
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(xˆi, Cˆi) = (xˆ1, Cˆ1) for all i = 1, . . . , n. Furthermore, any tuple of processes (x˜1, . . . , x˜n, C˜1, . . . , C˜n)
is a Nash equilibrium of the public good contribution game (4.1) if and only if (x˜i, C˜i) ∈ Bwi
with x˜i = xˆi P ⊗ dt-a.e. and E[∫ T0 ψc(t)dC˜i(t)] = E[∫ T0 ψc(t)dCˆi(t)] for all i = 1, . . . , n, and∑
i C˜
i(t) =
∑
i Cˆ
i(t) for all t ∈ [0, T ), P -a.s.
Proof. We first prove the second claim in five steps. Afterwards we will prove existence of a
symmetric Nash equilibrium in two further steps.
Step 1. As preliminary, notice that in any equilibrium (xˆ1, . . . , xˆn, Cˆ1, . . . , Cˆn), every agent
i = 1, . . . , n must exhaust his budget, wi = E
[∫ T
0 ψx(t)xˆ
i(t)dt+
∫ T
0 ψc(t) dCˆ
i(t)
]
, by the first of
(4.2), but not incur any costs for a final contribution, E[ψc(T )∆Cˆ
i(T )] = 0 (where ∆Cˆi(T ) :=
Cˆi(T )− Cˆi(T−)). Indeed, since ∆Cˆi(T ) does not affect U i(xˆi, Cˆi; Cˆ−i) in (2.3) and ui is strictly
increasing in x under Assumption 1, if δ := E[ψc(T )∆Cˆ
i(T )] > 0, then (x˜i, C˜i) = (xˆi +
δ/E[
∫ T
0 ψx(t)dt], Cˆ
i −∆Cˆi(T )1t=T ) ∈ Bwi would yield U i(x˜i, C˜i; Cˆ−i) > U i(xˆi, Cˆi; Cˆ−i).
Step 2. Now we show that under the assumption uxc ≥ 0, we must have symmetric Lagrange
multipliers λˆ1 = · · · = λˆn in the (necessary) first order conditions from Proposition 4.2 in any
equilibrium (xˆ1, . . . , xˆn, Cˆ1, . . . , Cˆn), and also symmetric private consumption xˆ1 = · · · = xˆn
P ⊗ dt-a.e.
In any equilibrium, every agent i = 1, . . . , n must have a Lagrange multiplier λˆi such that
the first order conditions (4.3) hold. By the third condition for an arbitrary agent i and the
second condition for any other agent j,
E
[∫ T
0
(
E
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
0 r(u) du
1
λˆi
h(λˆie
∫ s
0 r(u) duψx(s), Cˆ(s)) ds
∣∣∣∣ Ft]− ψc(t))dCˆi(t)] = 0
≥ E
[∫ T
0
(
E
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
0
r(u) du 1
λˆj
h(λˆje
∫ s
0
r(u) duψx(s), Cˆ(s)) ds
∣∣∣∣ Ft]− ψc(t))dCˆi(t)].
This inequality can only hold if E[CˆiT−] = 0 (then indeed equality holds) or if λˆ
j ≥ λˆi, because
the mapping λ 7→ 1λh(λψ, c) is strictly decreasing under the assumption uxc ≥ 0 by Lemma A.2
in the appendix. Thus, the λˆi of all agents i with E[CˆiT−] > 0 must be minimal and hence
identical. Then also the private consumptions xˆi(t) = g
(
λˆiψx(t), Cˆ(t)
)
P ⊗ dt-a.e. must be
identical among these agents.
Now consider an agent j with E[CˆjT−] = 0 and an arbitrary other agent i. Suppose λˆ
j ≥ λˆi
(which must hold if E[CˆiT−] > 0 as we have already shown, or which is without loss of generality
if also E[CˆiT−] = 0). Then xˆ
j(t) = g(λˆje
∫ t
0
r(s) dsψx(t), Cˆ(t)) ≤ g(λˆie
∫ t
0
r(s) dsψx(t), Cˆ(t)) = xˆ
i(t)
P ⊗ dt-a.e. by the monotonicity of g(ψ, c) in ψ; the inequality is even strict if λˆj > λˆi.
By Step 1, j exhausts his budget on private consumption, wj = w/n = E
[∫ T
0 ψx(t)xˆ
j(t)dt
] ≤
E
[∫ T
0 ψx(t)xˆ
i(t)dt +
∫ T
0 ψc(t) dCˆ
i(t)
]
= wi = w/n. As the inequality cannot be strict, we must
in fact have λˆj = λˆi, and thus also xˆi(t) = g
(
λˆiψx(t), Cˆ(t)
)
P ⊗ dt-a.e. must be the same for all
agents.
Step 3. Consider again any Nash equilibrium (xˆ1, . . . , xˆn, Cˆ1, . . . , Cˆn), whence the necessary
and sufficient first order conditions (4.2) hold for all agents i = 1, . . . , n with symmetric Lagrange
multipliers λˆ1 = · · · = λˆn and also xˆ1 = · · · = xˆn P ⊗ dt-a.e. by Step 2. We now show that
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if another tuple (x˜1, . . . , x˜n, C˜1, . . . , C˜n) satisfies (x˜i, C˜i) ∈ Bwi with x˜i = xˆi P ⊗ dt-a.e. and
E
[∫ T
0 ψc(t)dC˜
i(t)
]
= E
[∫ T
0 ψc(t)dCˆ
i(t)
]
for all i = 1, . . . , n, and
∑
i C˜
i(t) =
∑
i Cˆ
i(t) for all
t ∈ [0, T ), P -a.s., then the first order conditions (4.2) also hold for (x˜1, . . . , x˜n, C˜1, . . . , C˜n) with
λ˜i = λˆ1, i = 1, . . . , n. This will prove sufficiency in the second claim of the theorem.
Indeed, the first condition of (4.2) holds by the feasibility hypothesis (x˜i, C˜i) ∈ Bwi . The
second and fourth of (4.2) are identical to those from the initial equilibrium as x˜i = xˆi and
C˜ = Cˆ P ⊗ dt-a.e., and λ˜i = λˆi by hypothesis. If one takes the sum of the third condition of
(4.2) over all i = 1, . . . , n in the initial equilibrium, where now only dCˆi can depend on i, then
one gets
E
[∫ T
0
(
E
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
0
r(u) duuc(xˆ
1(s), Cˆ(s)) ds
∣∣∣∣ Ft]− λˆ1ψc(t))dCˆ(t)] = 0. (4.4)
As the measure dC˜i is absolutely continuous with respect to dC˜ = dCˆ on [0, T ), (4.4) implies
the third condition of (4.2) for x˜i = xˆ1, C˜ = Cˆ (P ⊗ dt-a.e.), λ˜i = λˆ1 and dC˜i, up to a possible
terminal mass ∆C˜i(T ). By Step 1, however, E[ψc(T )∆Cˆ
i(T )] = 0, thus E
[∫ T
0 ψc(t)dCˆ(t)
]
=
E
[∫
[0,T ) ψc(t)dCˆ(t)
]
= E
[∫
[0,T ) ψc(t)dC˜(t)
]
in sum. By hypothesis, also E
[∫ T
0 ψc(t)dCˆ(t)
]
=
E
[∫ T
0 ψc(t)dC˜(t)
]
, so E[ψc(T )∆C˜(T )] = 0 and hence E[ψc(T )∆C˜
i(T )] = 0, which completes
the third condition of (4.2) for x˜i, C˜, λ˜i and dC˜i.
Notice that one can set in particular C˜i = Cˆ/n, i = 1, . . . , n. Indeed, E
[∫ T
0 ψc(t)dCˆ
i(t)
]
=
w/n − E[∫ T0 ψx(t)xˆi(t)dt] are identical for all agents in equilibrium, as the xˆi are identical by
Step 2 and the budget constraints binding by Step 1 ; thus, summing up, E
[∫ T
0 ψc(t) dCˆ(t)
]
=
w − nE[∫ T0 ψx(t)xˆ1(t)dt] = nE[∫ T0 ψc(t) dCˆ1(t)] and (xˆi, Cˆ/n) ∈ Bw/n.
Step 4. Now we can establish uniqueness of Cˆ on [0, T ) in equilibrium. Consider two equi-
libria with aggregate Cˆ and C˜ and symmetric Lagrange multipliers λˆ1 = · · · = λˆn =: λˆ and
λ˜1 = · · · = λ˜n =: λ˜ by Step 2. Let λˆ ≥ λ˜ without loss of generality. Only employing
the last two of (4.3) we now show that we then have a uniform ordering Cˆ ≤ C˜, P ⊗ dt-
a.e. Therefore let σε := inf{t ≥ 0 | Cˆt > C˜t + ε} ∧ T ∈ T for arbitrary ε > 0, and
τε := inf{t ≥ σε | C˜t > Cˆt − ε/2} ∧ T ∈ T . Then τε > σε on {σε < T} by right-continuity of
Cˆ − C˜ and Cˆ(t) > C˜(t) on [σε, τε) (all P -a.s.). σε and τε are points of increase of the processes
Cˆ and C˜, respectively, and hence of Cˆi and C˜j for some players i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.7 Therefore,
by the third condition of (4.3), the second condition of (4.3) for Cˆ, λˆ must be binding at τ = σε
on {σε < T} (see Proposition 3.2 of Steg (2012) for a proof). Then, on {σε < T} we obtain the
following chain (up to a P -nullset):
E
[∫ T
σε
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
1
λˆ
h(λˆe
∫ t
0 r(s) dsψx(t), Cˆ(t)) dt
∣∣∣∣ Fσε] = ψc(σε)
≥ E
[∫ T
σε
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
1
λ˜
h(λ˜e
∫ t
0 r(s) dsψx(t), C˜(t)) dt
∣∣∣∣ Fσε]
> E
[∫ τε
σε
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
1
λ˜
h(λ˜e
∫ t
0 r(s) dsψx(t), Cˆ(t)) dt
∣∣∣∣ Fσε]
7τ ∈ T is a point of increase of the optional, non-decreasing process Cˆ if Cˆ(t) > Cˆ(τ−) for all t ∈ (τ, T ], P -a.s.
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+E
[∫ T
τε
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
1
λ˜
h(λ˜e
∫ t
0 r(s) dsψx(t), C˜(t)) dt
∣∣∣∣ Fσε]
= E
[∫ τε
σε
e−
∫ t
0
r(s) ds 1
λ˜
h(λ˜e
∫ t
0
r(s) dsψx(t), Cˆ(t)) dt
∣∣∣∣ Fσε]+ E[ψc(τε) ∣∣ Fσε]
≥ E
[∫ τε
σε
e−
∫ t
0
r(s) ds 1
λ˜
h(λ˜e
∫ t
0
r(s) dsψx(t), Cˆ(t)) dt
∣∣∣∣ Fσε] (4.5)
+E
[∫ T
τε
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
1
λˆ
h(λˆe
∫ t
0 r(s) dsψx(t), Cˆ(t)) dt
∣∣∣∣ Fσε]
≥ E
[∫ T
σε
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
1
λˆ
h(λˆe
∫ t
0 r(s) dsψx(t), Cˆ(t)) dt
∣∣∣∣ Fσε].
Here the first inequality is the second condition of (4.3) for C˜, λ˜; the strict inequality holds by
the strict monotonicity of h in c and Cˆ(t) > C˜(t) on [σε, τε), which is non-empty on {σε < T}; the
equality is from the second condition of (4.3) for C˜, λ˜ being binding at τ = τε on {τε < T} (since
τε is a point of increase of some C˜
j, j = 1, . . . , n), using iterated expectations; the next inequality
is the second condition of (4.3) for Cˆ, λˆ; the last inequality is from λ 7→ 1λh(λψ, c) being strictly
decreasing (see again Lemma A.2 in the appendix) and λˆ ≥ λ˜. To avoid a contradiction in (4.5),
we must have σε = T P -a.s. for all ε > 0, and thus Cˆ ≤ C˜ on [0, T ), P -a.s.
Notice now that with uxc ≥ 0, g(ψ, c) is nondecreasing in c (and strictly decreasing in ψ).
Thus, given the ordering Cˆ ≤ C˜ (P ⊗ dt-a.e.) and λˆ ≥ λ˜, we obtain xˆi(t) = g(λˆψx(t), Cˆ(t)) ≤
x˜i(t) = g
(
λ˜ψx(t), C˜(t)
)
. We may assume that the first hypothesized equilibrium is symmetric,
Cˆi = 1n Cˆ, by Step 3. In that equilibrium, any player, say i = 1, now has a feasible deviation
by following 1n C˜ ≥ 1n Cˆ, which costs E
[∫ T
0 ψc(t) dC˜
i(t)
] ≤ w/n − E[∫ T0 ψx(t)x˜i(t)dt] ≤ w/n −
E
[∫ T
0 ψx(t)xˆ
i(t)dt
]
. If 1n C˜ >
1
n Cˆ with positive measure, the former would be strictly better
since ui is strictly increasing in c, so we must have C˜ = Cˆ P ⊗ dt a.e. if the latter is indeed an
equilibrium. By right-continuity, then even Cˆ(t) = C˜(t) for all t ∈ [0, T ), P -a.s.
Step 5. To complete the proof of necessity in the second claim of the theorem, it remains
to prove uniqueness of the private consumption and of the costs of individual contributions in
equilibrium. Consider two Nash equilibria (xˆ1, . . . , xˆn, Cˆ1, . . . , Cˆn) and (x˜1, . . . , x˜n, C˜1, . . . , C˜n)
with respective symmetric Lagrange multipliers λˆ1 = · · · = λˆn =: λˆ and λ˜1 = · · · = λ˜n =: λ˜ by
Step 2. Let λˆ ≥ λ˜ without loss of generality. By Step 3, Cˆ = C˜ P⊗dt a.e. Then the corresponding
private consumptions are xˆi(t) = g
(
λˆψx(t), Cˆ(t)
) ≤ x˜i(t) = g(λ˜ψx(t), C˜(t)) P ⊗ dt a.e. by the
monotonicity of g(ψ, c) in ψ, strictly if λˆ > λ˜. However, by Step 1,
∑
iE
[∫ T
0 ψx(t)xˆ
i(t)dt
]
=
w − E[∫ T0 ψc(t) dCˆ(t)] = w − E[∫ T0 ψc(t) dC˜(t)] = ∑iE[∫ T0 ψx(t)x˜i(t)dt], so we must have
λˆ = λ˜ and thus xˆi = x˜i, P ⊗ dt a.e. Then, again by Step 1, E[∫ T0 ψc(t) dCˆi(t)] = wi −
E
[∫ T
0 ψx(t)xˆ
i(t)dt
]
= wi − E[∫ T0 ψx(t)x˜i(t)dt] = E[∫ T0 ψc(t) dC˜i(t)].
Finally, in the next two steps we establish existence of a symmetric equilibrium. First,
we argue that one can take the solution of an auxiliary single-agent problem with any given
budget w′ to construct a symmetric n-agent equilibrium with some resulting budget w¯. To find
a symmetric equilibrium for a given budget w, we argue afterwards that one can chose the initial
single-agent budget w′ to match w¯ = w.
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Step 6. n is our given number of symmetric agents. Consider now the auxiliary single-agent
problem with n′ = 1 and utility function u of the symmetric agents and arbitrary budget w′ > 0.
This problem has a solution (x′∗, C
′
∗) by Theorem 3.1 (with γ
1 = 1) and a Lagrange multiplier
λ′∗ by necessity in Proposition 3.3 such that the first order conditions (3.10) are satisfied. The
latter differ from the first order conditions (4.3) in a symmetric n-agent Nash equilibrium only
by the budget constraint, where we have dC ′∗ for the single agent and dCˆ/n in the symmetric
equilibrium (the factor 1/n does not affect the respective third condition). If we now define
Cˆi := C ′∗/n (so that Cˆ ≡ C ′∗) and λˆi := λ′∗ (whence xˆi = x′∗ via the function g), then we have a
symmetric solution to the equilibrium first order conditions (4.3) with individual budgets
wi ≡ w¯
n
:= E
[∫ T
0
ψx(t)g(λˆe
∫ t
0 r(s) dsψx(t), Cˆ(t)) dt +
∫ T
0
ψc(t)
1
n
dCˆ(t)
]
.
and hence a symmetric equilibrium for the aggregate budget w¯. Notice that simple algebra
implies
E
[∫ T
0
ψc(t)
1
n
dCˆ(t)
]
= E
[∫ T
0
ψc(t)dCˆ(t)
]
− n− 1
n
E
[∫ T
0
ψc(t)dCˆ(t)
]
(4.6)
and therefore we can rewrite
w¯
n
= w′ − n− 1
n
E
[∫ T
0
ψc(t) dCˆ(t)
]
, (4.7)
upon recalling Cˆ ≡ C ′∗ and using the budget constraint of the auxiliary single agent with initial
wealth w′.
Step 7. We now have to find an initial w′ such that the construction in Step 6 yields w¯ equal
to our given w. First of all, by noticing that 0 ≤ E[∫ T0 ψc(t) dCˆ(t)] ≤ w′ since Cˆ ≡ C ′∗, it follows
from (4.7) that w¯ ∈ [w′, nw′] and therefore the candidates w′ = w/n and w′ = w yield symmetric
equilibria with budgets enclosing w. Thus it remains to show that w¯ depends continuously on
w′ to complete the proof.
As the first two elements of any solution (x′∗, C
′
∗, λ
′
∗) of the first order conditions (3.10) for
the auxiliary single-agent problem are P ⊗ dt-essentially unique, they can be understood as a
function of w′, and thus also w¯ is a function of w′ by (4.7) with Cˆ ≡ C ′∗ and E[ψc(T )∆Cˆ(T )] = 0
by Step 1.
Now we show that (x′∗, C
′
∗) is non-decreasing in w
′. Therefore consider a second single-
agent budget w′′ > 0 and corresponding solution (x′′∗ , C
′′
∗ , λ
′′
∗) of (3.10). Suppose λ
′
∗ ≤ λ′′∗.
We have shown in the first part of Step 4 – which applies also to the particular case n′ = 1,
when Nash equilibrium and social planner solution become the same concept, and further to
two equilibria with different budgets, since only the last two conditions of (4.3) were used –
that under the assumption uxc ≥ 0, we must then have C ′′∗ ≤ C ′∗, P ⊗ dt-a.e. Further, as
g(ψ, c) is strictly decreasing in ψ and now gc(ψ, c) = −uxc(g(ψ, c), c))/uxx(g(ψ, c), c) ≥ 0, also
x′′∗(t) = g
(
λ′′∗ψx(t), C
′′
∗ (t)
) ≤ g(λ′∗ψx(t), C ′∗(t)) = x′∗(t) P ⊗dt-a.e., strictly if λ′∗ < λ′′∗ . Due to the
monotonicity of u in (x, c), now the maximized utilities given in (3.2) must satisfy VSP (w
′′) ≤
VSP (w
′), strictly if λ′∗ < λ
′′
∗ . By switching roles, we get the opposite inequalities throughout if
λ′∗ ≥ λ′′∗ .
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On the other hand, if w′′ ≥ w′, then Bw′ ⊂ Bw′′ and thus VSP (w′′) ≥ VSP (w′). In combination
with the contraposition of the previously established implication λ′∗ < λ
′′
∗ ⇒ VSP (w′′) < VSP (w′),
we obtain w′′ ≥ w′ ⇒ VSP (w′′) ≥ VSP (w′)⇒ λ′∗ ≥ λ′′∗ ⇒ C ′∗ ≤ C ′′∗ and x′∗ ≤ x′′∗, P ⊗ dt-a.e.
Now consider a monotone sequence of single-agent budgets {w′k}k∈N converging to some
w′ > 0, with the associated monotone sequences {C ′∗k}k∈N and {x′∗k}k∈N (and {λ′∗k}k∈N). Then
lim
k→∞
w′k = lim
k→∞
E
[∫ T
0
ψx(t)x
′
∗k(t) dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dC
′
∗k(t)
]
= w′ = E
[∫ T
0
ψx(t)x
′
∗(t) dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dC
′
∗(t)
]
.
Here both integrals are non-decreasing in k in expectation, the first clearly by monotonicity
of {x′∗k}k∈N. Further, C ′∗k ≤ C ′∗k+1 P ⊗ dt a.e. must also imply δk := E[
∫ T
0 ψc(t)dC
′
∗k(t)] −
E[
∫ T
0 ψc(t)dC
′
∗k+1(t)] ≤ 0, because if δk > 0, then (x′k, C ′k) := (x′∗k + δk/E[
∫ T
0 ψx(t)dt], C
′
∗k+1) ∈
Bw′
k
would yield U1(x′k, C
′
k) > U
1(x′∗k, C
′
∗k) since u is strictly increasing in (x, c). By monotonic-
ity, both integrals must converge in expectation. Thus the associated sequence
w¯k − w¯
n
= w′k − w′ −
n− 1
n
E
[∫ T
0
ψc(t)
(
dC ′∗k(t)− dC ′∗(t)
)]
from the construction in Step 6 must vanish as k → ∞. In summary, w¯ depends continuously
on w′, such that we can indeed find an initial w′ yielding w¯ = w.
Since the first order conditions in a symmetric equilibrium are the same for all agents and of
a similar form as those for the social planner, we can “solve” them in form of a signal process lˆ
as in Theorem 3.5. The proof uses analogous arguments as that of Theorem 3.5 and is therefore
omitted.
Theorem 4.4. Let Assumption 2 hold. Also, assume that all the agents have the same initial
wealth wi = w/n > 0 and the same utility function ui ≡ u satisfying Assumption 1. Then there
is a Nash equilibrium of the public good contribution game (4.1) given by
Cˆi(t) = sup0≤u≤t lˆ(u) ∨ 0,
xˆi(t) = g
(
λˆψx(t), Cˆ(t)
) (4.8)
for all i = 1, . . . , n if lˆ is an optional, upper right-continuous process solving the stochastic
backward equation
E
[∫ T
τ
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) dsh
(
λˆe
∫ t
0 r(u)duψx(t), n sup
τ≤u≤t
l(u)
)
dt
∣∣∣∣ Fτ] = λˆψc(τ)1{τ<T} (4.9)
for any stopping time τ ∈ [0, T ] with lˆT = 0, P -a.s., for a Lagrange multiplier λˆ > 0 such that
Ψ(xˆi, Cˆi) = w/n.
Remark 4.5. Notice that if the Inada conditions from Proposition 3.4 hold for h, then we have
also necessity in Theorem 4.4 for the symmetric equilibrium identified in Theorem 4.3.
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5 The Free Rider Effect
In economics, the free rider problem occurs when those who benefit from resources, goods, or
services do not pay (sufficiently) for them, which results in either an under-provision of those
goods or services, or in an overuse or degradation of a common property resource. The free rider
problem is common among public goods, because of their non-excludability – once provided it
is for everybody – and non-rivalry – the consumption of the good by an agent does not reduce
the amount available to others. We refer to Cornes and Sandler (1996) or Laffont (1988) for
more details.
The next proposition shows that in a symmetric setting, the total expenditure for the public
good is higher if one follows the symmetric social planner’s optimal policy than the symmetric
Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 5.1. Under the assumptions of Theorem 4.3, let (xi∗, C
i
∗) ≡ ( 1nx∗, 1nC∗), i =
1, . . . , n, represent the symmetric social planner solution of Theorem 3.5 with γi = 1/n, n > 1,
and (xˆi, Cˆi) ≡ ( 1n xˆ, 1nCˆ), i = 1, . . . , n, represent the symmetric Nash equilibrium of Theorem
4.3. If E[C∗(T )] > 0, then
E
[∫ T
0
ψc(t)(dC∗(t)− dCˆ(t))
]
> 0;
that is, the total expenditure for the public good is higher for the social planner.
Proof. If E[C∗(T )] > 0, then the social planner solution cannot be a Nash equilibrium by
comparing the first order conditions (3.10) and (4.3) (here with γi = 1/n, n > 1). Indeed, if it
were, then by the budget constraint we would need to have λ∗/γ
i = λˆi, whence the respective
third conditions could not be reconciled if dC∗ > 0 with positive measure. By uniqueness of the
social planner optimal policy (cf. Theorem 3.1), the symmetric social planner solution ( 1nx∗,
1
nC∗)
now gives everybody a higher expected utility than the symmetric equilibrium ( 1n xˆ,
1
n Cˆ). Hence
0 < E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0
r(s) ds
[
u
( 1
n
x∗(t), C∗(t)
)
− u
( 1
n
xˆ(t), Cˆ(t)
)]
dt
]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) dsux
( 1
n
xˆ(t), Cˆ(t)
) 1
n
(x∗(t)− xˆ(t)) dt
]
+E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) dsuc
( 1
n
xˆ(t), Cˆ(t)
)
(C∗(t)− Cˆ(t)) dt
]
(5.1)
= E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0
r(s) dsux
( 1
n
xˆ(t), Cˆ(t)
) 1
n
(x∗(t)− xˆ(t)) dt
]
+E
[∫ T
0
E
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
0 r(u) duuc
( 1
n
xˆ(s), Cˆ(s)
)
ds
∣∣∣∣ Ft](dC∗(t)− dCˆ(t))]
where concavity of u has been used to derive the second inequality, whereas an application of
Fubini’s Theorem and Theorem 1.33 in Jacod (1979) justify the last step (see also Remark 3.2).
Employing now the first order conditions (4.2) in the last two expected values in (5.1) and noting
that λˆi > 0 we get
E
[∫ T
0
1
n
ψx(t)(x∗(t)− xˆ(t))dt +
∫ T
0
ψc(t)(dC∗(t)− dCˆ(t))
]
> 0. (5.2)
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On the other hand, subtracting the budget constraint associated to the symmetric social planner
solution (i.e. the first of (3.8)) and the aggregated budget constraint associated to the symmetric
Nash equilibrium (i.e. the sum over all the agents of the first in (4.2)) one easily obtains
E
[∫ T
0
ψx(t)(x∗(t)− xˆ(t))dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)(dC∗(t)− dCˆ(t))
]
= 0. (5.3)
Therefore, by (5.2) and (5.3) one finds
E
[∫ T
0
ψx(t)(x∗(t)− xˆ(t))dt
]
< 0 and E
[∫ T
0
ψc(t)(dC∗(t)− dCˆ(t))
]
> 0;
that is, the total expenditure for the public good is higher for the social planner.
In order to find if our model exhibits a (dynamic) free rider effect one should be able to
compare the efficient social planner solution C∗ with a Nash equilibrium outcome of the public
good contribution game, Cˆ, so to show C∗ ≥ Cˆ P ⊗ dt-a.e. In the generality of our model
that seems a difficult task, even in a symmetric setting in which all the economic agents share
the same utility function and the same wealth. Indeed, a comparison of the symmetric Nash
equilibrium of (4.8) with the social planner solution (3.12) seems possible only if a ranking
between the Lagrange multipliers λ∗ and λˆ is known. Unfortunately, we have not been able to
determine such a ranking in the general framework.
We have thus specified the setting, so to perform direct calculations and explicitly evaluate
the free rider effect. Our chosen model satisfies the following assumption which shall hold
throughout the remainder of this section.
Assumption 3.
i. ui(x, c) = x
αcβ
α+β , i = 1, . . . , n, for some α, β ∈ (0, 1) such that α+ β < 1;
ii. wi = wo for all i = 1, . . . , n;
iii. ψx(t) = e
−rtEx(t) = e−rt+Zx(t)−πx(1)t and ψc(t) = e−rtEc(t) = e−rt+Zc(t)−πc(1)t for some
independent Le´vy processes Zx and Zc such that the Laplace transforms
πx(ξ) := logE[e
ξZx(1)] and πc(ξ) := logE[e
ξZc(1)],
are well defined for all ξ ∈ R.
We refer the reader to Bertoin (1996), among others, for a detailed introduction to Le´vy
processes. Notice that uncertainty in our model is still much more general than the Brownian
one commonly assumed in the literature. Indeed we drop the assumption of normally distributed
increments, while keeping a convenient Markovian structure. Our setup also covers the case of
jump processes, like the Poisson process, or that of jump-diffusion processes, as well as the
deterministic case.
The next lemma will be useful in the following
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Lemma 5.2. Let Assumption 3 hold and recall the measure P˜c such that
dP˜c
dP = Ec(T ) on FT .
The processes
Zˆ(t) := − β
1− α− β (Zc(t)− πc(1)t)−
αβ
(1− α)(1 − α− β)(Zx(t)− πx(1)t)
and
Z˜(t) := − α
1− α− β (Zx(t)− πx(1)t) −
1− α
1− α− β (Zc(t)− πc(1)t)
are Le´vy. Moreover,
i. the Laplace exponent under P of Zˆ at ξ = 2 is given by
πˆ(2) := logE[e2Zˆ(1)]
=
2
1− α− β
[
βπc(1) +
αβ
1− απx(1)
]
+ πc
(
− 2β
1− α− β
)
+ πx
(
− 2αβ
(1− α)(1 − α− β)
)
;
ii. the Laplace exponent under P˜c of Z˜ at ξ = 1 is given by
π˜(1) := log E˜c[e
Z˜(1)]
=
1
1− α− β
[
βπc(1) + απx(1)
]
+ πc
(
− β
1− α− β
)
+ πx
(
− α
1− α− β
)
.
Proof. The processes Zˆ and Z˜ are Le´vy because they are linear combinations of independent
Le´vy processes. The expression of the Laplace exponent πˆ(2) can be easily obtained exploiting
independence of Zx and Zc. On the other hand, recalling that
dP˜c
dP = Ec(1) on F1 and using
again independence of Zx and Zc, π˜(1) follows.
We now make the following assumption to ensure finiteness of relevant quantities in the
following.
Assumption 4. r > max
{
0, α1−απx(1),
α
1−απx(1) + πx(− 2α1−α), πˆ(2) + α1−απx(1), π˜(1)
}
.
Assumptions 3 and 4 will be kept throughout this section. In the next two propositions we
explicitly solve the social planner problem and we find the explicit form of the symmetric Nash
equilibrium of Theorem 4.4.
Proposition 5.3. Assume that the social planner weights are γi = 1n for every i = 1, . . . , n and
define the processes
γ(t) :=
1
A
[(α+ β
α
)
Ex(t) inf
0≤s≤t
(
E
β(1−α)
1−α−β
c (s)E
αβ
1−α−β
x (s)
)]− 1
1−α
, (5.4)
θ(t) := sup
0≤s≤t
(
E−
1−α
1−α−β
c (s)E
− α
1−α−β
x (s)
)
, (5.5)
and the constants
l0 :=
nwo
E
[∫ ∞
0
ψx(t)γ(t)dt+
∫ ∞
0
ψc(t)dθ(t)
] (5.6)
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and
A := E
[∫ ∞
0
δe−ru inf
0≤s≤u
(
Ec(s)E
− α
1−α
x (u− s)
)
du
]
(5.7)
with δ := βα
(
α+β
α
) 1
α−1
.
Then the social planner’s optimal solution is such that
C∗(t) = l0θ(t) (5.8)
and
xi∗(t) =
1
n
l0γ(t), i = 1, . . . , n, (5.9)
with
λ∗ =
1
nα
A1−αlα+β−10 .
Proof. By Theorem 3.5, to find the social planner’s optimal policy it suffices to solve the back-
ward equation (3.11).
Recall that hi(ψ, c) = uic(g
i(ψ, c), c), where gi(·, c) is the inverse of uix(·, c). For any λ > 0,
simple algebra leads to hi( λ
γi
ertψx(t), C(t)) = δ(nλEx(t))
α
α−1C
α+β−1
1−α (t) with δ := βα
(
α+β
α
) 1
α−1
.
Set C∗(t) = sup0≤s≤t l
∗(s)∨0 for some progressively measurable process l∗ to be found and then
(3.11) becomes
E
[∫ ∞
τ
δe−rs(nλEx(s))
α
α−1
(
sup
τ≤u≤s
l∗(u)
)α+β−1
1−α
ds
∣∣∣∣ Fτ] = λe−rτEc(τ),
i.e.,
E
[∫ ∞
0
δe−ru(nλ)
α
α−1
Ex
α
α−1 (u+ τ)
Ec(τ) inf0≤s≤u
(
l∗
α+β−1
1−α (s+ τ)
)
du
∣∣∣∣ Fτ] = λ. (5.10)
Make now the ansatz l∗(t) := l0Ec
1−α
α+β−1 (t)Ex
α
α+β−1 (t) for some constant l0, and use independence
and stationarity of Le´vy increments to rewrite (5.10) as
1
n
α
1−α
l
α+β−1
1−α
0 E
[∫ ∞
0
δe−ru inf
0≤s≤u
(
Ec(s)E
α
α−1
x (u− s)
)
du
]
= λ
1
1−α .
Set now A := E[
∫∞
0 δe
−ru inf0≤s≤u(Ec(s)E
− α
1−α
x (u− s))du] and notice that it is finite. Indeed
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
δe−ru inf
0≤s≤u
(Ec(s)E
− α
1−α
x (u− s))du
]
≤ E
[ ∫ ∞
0
δe−ruEc(u)du
]
=
∫ ∞
0
δe−ruE
[Ec(u)]du = δ
r
,
where the second step follows from Tonelli’s theorem, whereas the last one by the fact that Ec
is a martingale (cf. Assumption 2).
Then, by solving the previous equation for λ one easily obtains
λ =
1
nα
A1−αlα+β−10 =: λ∗.
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On the other hand, xi∗(t) = [nλ∗
(
α+β
α
)
Ex(t)C−β∗ (t)]
1
α−1 by (3.9) and therefore
xi∗(t) = (nλ∗)
− 1
1−α
[(
α+ β
α
)
Ex(t)l−β0 inf
0≤s≤t
(
E
β(1−α)
1−α−β
c (s)E
αβ
1−α−β
x (s)
)]− 1
1−α
;
that is,
xi∗(t) =
1
n
l0γ(t) (5.11)
with γ(t) as in (5.4).
To determine l0 we make use of the budget constraint E[
∫∞
0 ψx(t)x∗(t)dt+
∫∞
0 ψc(t)dC∗(t)] =
nwo. In fact, recalling that x∗ :=
∑n
i=1 x
i
∗, from (5.11) we find
l0E
[∫ ∞
0
ψx(t)γ(t)dt +
∫ ∞
0
ψc(t)dθ(t)
]
= nwo, (5.12)
since C∗(t) = sup0≤s≤t l
∗(s) = l0 sup0≤s≤t(E
− 1−α
1−α−β
c (s)E
− α
1−α−β
x (s)) = l0θ(t) with θ(t) as in (5.5)
and if E[
∫∞
0 ψx(t)γ(t)dt +
∫∞
0 ψc(t)dθ(t)] <∞. Then, by solving (5.12) for l0, (5.6) follows.
To conclude the proof it thus remains to show that E[
∫∞
0 ψx(t)γ(t)dt+
∫∞
0 ψc(t)dθ(t)] <∞.
We start showing E[
∫∞
0 ψx(t)γ(t)dt] <∞. Define the Le´vy process Zˆ(t) := − β1−α−β (Zc(t)−
πc(1)t)− αβ(1−α)(1−α−β) (Zx(t)−πx(1)t) (cf. Lemma 5.2) and denote by τξ an independent random
time, exponentially distributed with parameter ξ := r − α1−απx(1). Noticing that ξ > 0 by
Assumption 4, one has
A
(
α+ β
α
) 1
1−α
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
ψx(t)γ(t)dt
]
= E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rtE−
α
1−α
x (t) sup
0≤s≤t
(
E
β(1−α)
1−α−β
c (s)E
αβ
1−α−β
x (s)
)− 1
1−α
dt
]
= ξ−1E
[
e−
α
1−α
Zx(τξ)e
sup0≤s≤τξ
Zˆ(s)
]
≤ ξ−1E
[
e−
2α
1−α
Zx(τξ)
] 1
2
E
[
e
2 sup0≤s≤τξ
Zˆ(s)
] 1
2
,
where Ho¨lder’s inequality has been used in the last step. Denoting by πˆ the Laplace exponent
of Zˆ under P , by the Wiener-Hopf factorization (see, e.g., Chapter VI.2 in Bertoin (1996)) we
have E[e
2 sup0≤s≤τξ
Zˆ(s)
] <∞ and E[e− 2α1−αZx(τξ)] <∞ because ξ > πˆ(2)∨πx(− 2α1−α ) by definition
of ξ and Assumption 4.
We now prove E[
∫∞
0 ψc(t)dθ(t)] <∞. Fix 0 < T <∞ and recall (cf. proof of Theorem 3.1) the
measure P˜c such that
dP˜c
dP = Ec(T ) on FT . Then a change of measure and integration by parts
lead to
E
[ ∫ T
0
ψc(t)dθ(t)
]
= E˜c
[ ∫ T
0
e−rtdθ(t)
]
= E˜c
[
e−rT θ(T )− 1 +
∫ T
0
re−rtθ(t)dt
]
,
where we have used that θ(0) = 1 due to (5.5). Therefore, taking limits as T ↑ ∞ and invoking
the monotone convergence theorem we obtain
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
ψc(t)dθ(t)
]
= E˜c
[
lim
T↑∞
e−rT θ(T )
]
+ E˜c
[ ∫ ∞
0
re−rtθ(t)dt
]
− 1.
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Hence E˜c[
∫∞
0 re
−rtθ(t)dt] < ∞ is necessary to have E[∫∞0 ψc(t)dθ(t)] < ∞. It is actually also
sufficient since it also implies limT↑∞ e
−rT θ(T ) = 0 P˜c-a.s. as it is shown, e.g., in Bank and Riedel
(2001), proof of Lemma 4.9-(i). But now
E˜c
[ ∫ ∞
0
re−rtθ(t)dt
]
= E˜c
[
esup0≤s≤τr Z˜(s)
]
, (5.13)
where we have defined the Le´vy process (cf. Lemma 5.2) Z˜(t) := − α1−α−β (Zx(t) − πx(1)t) −
1−α
1−α−β (Zc(t) − πc(1)t) and where τr is an independent random time exponentially distributed
with parameter r. By Wiener-Hopf factorization we conclude that the right hand-side of (5.13)
is finite if r > π˜(1) where π˜ is the Laplace exponent of Z˜ under P˜c (cf. Lemma 5.2). The proof
is now complete due to Assumption 4.
We now explicitly solve the best reply problems (4.1). The proof of the following result
employs arguments similar to those used for the proof of Proposition 5.3; it is relegated to
Appendix A, Section A.4, for the sake of completeness.
Proposition 5.4. Define the processes
γ(t) :=
1
A
[(α+ β
α
)
Ex(t) inf
0≤s≤t
(
E
β(1−α)
1−α−β
c (s)E
αβ
1−α−β
x (s)
)]− 1
1−α
, (5.14)
θ(t) := sup
0≤s≤t
(
E−
1−α
1−α−β
c (s)E
− α
1−α−β
x (s)
)
, (5.15)
and the constants
κ :=
wo
E
[∫ ∞
0
ψx(t)γ(t)dt+
1
n
∫ ∞
0
ψc(t)dθ(t)
] (5.16)
and
A := E
[∫ ∞
0
δe−ru inf
0≤s≤u
(
Ec(s)E
− α
1−α
x (u− s)
)
du
]
(5.17)
with δ := βα
(
α+β
α
) 1
α−1
.
Then the symmetric Nash equilibrium of game (4.1) is given by
Cˆi(t) =
κ
n
θ(t), i = 1, . . . , n, (5.18)
xˆi(t) = κγ(t), i = 1, . . . , n, (5.19)
with
λˆi = A1−ακα+β−1, i = 1, . . . , n.
Thanks to the results of Propositions 5.3 and 5.4, we are now able to explicitly evaluate the
free rider effect for our symmetric economy with Cobb-Douglas utilities and Le´vy uncertainty.
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Let xi∗ be the optimal private consumption in the social planner’s problem (cf. (5.9)), and let xˆ
i
denote the Nash equilibrium private consumption (cf. (5.19)). Then one has
xi∗(t) =
woγ(t)
E
[∫ ∞
0
ψx(t)γ(t)dt +
∫ ∞
0
ψc(t)dθ(t)
]
≤ woγ(t)
E
[∫ ∞
0
ψx(t)γ(t)dt +
1
n
∫ ∞
0
ψc(t)dθ(t)
] = xˆi(t),
with equality for n = 1. It follows that in a strategic context each agent spends more for the
private consumption than what would be suggested by the social planner. On the other hand,
we have κ ≤ l0 (with κ as in (5.16), l0 as in (5.6) and equality if n = 1) which implies that
C∗(t) = l0θ(t) ≥ κθ(t) = Cˆ(t), P -a.s. ∀ t ≥ 0;
that is, the social planner’s optimal cumulative contribution into the public good (5.8) is bigger
than the corresponding Nash equilibrium counterpart (5.18). Our model thus exhibits a free
rider effect.
5.1 Free Rider Effect: The Role of Uncertainty
The evaluation of the free rider effect can be made even more explicit in a Black-Scholes setting
and with the public good taken as a nume´raire.
Proposition 5.5. Let C∗ be the optimal aggregated public good contribution for the social plan-
ner problem (cf. (5.8)) and let Cˆ denote its symmetric Nash-equilibrium value (cf. (5.18)). As-
sume ψc(t) = e
−rt and ψx(t) = e
−rtEx(t) ≡ e−rt+σW (t), σ > 0, for a one-dimensional Brownian
motion W and for some r such that
√
2r > σα1−α−β .
8 Then, for any n ≥ 1 one has
Cˆ(t)
C∗(t)
=
κ
l0
=
α+ β
nα+ β
≤ 1, (5.20)
where κ and l0 are as in (5.16) and (5.6), respectively.
Proof. From (5.8) and (5.18) it easily follows that
Cˆ(t)
C∗(t)
=
κ
l0
=
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtEx(t)γ(t)dt +
∫ ∞
0
e−rtdθ(t)
]
E
[
n
∫ ∞
0
e−rtEx(t)γ(t)dt+
∫ ∞
0
e−rtdθ(t)
]
=
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtEx(t)γ(t)dt + r
∫ ∞
0
e−rtθ(t)dt
]
E
[
n
∫ ∞
0
e−rtEx(t)γ(t)dt+ r
∫ ∞
0
e−rtθ(t)dt
] , (5.21)
8Notice that the martingale property of Assumption 2 is without loss of generality in this case, one just has
to correct r by 1
2
σ2, i.e. by the Laplace exponents of σW (t)
t
.
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with γ(t) and θ(t) as in (5.14) and (5.15), respectively. Then, in order to obtain (5.20), we need
to evaluate
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtEx(t)γ(t)dt
]
and E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rtθ(t)dt
]
.
We have
E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rtθ(t)dt
]
= E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rt sup
0≤s≤t
E−
α
1−α−β
x (s) dt
]
= E
[
e−
σα
1−α−β
inf0≤s≤τr W (s)
]
= E
[
e
σα
1−α−β
sup0≤s≤τr (W˜ (s))
]
=
√
2r√
2r − σα1−α−β
, (5.22)
where W˜ := −W , τr is an independent exponentially distributed random time and where the
last equality follows from sup0≤s≤τr(W˜ (s)) ∼ Exp(
√
2r) (cf., e.g., Bertoin (1996), Chapter
VII or Borodin and Salminen (2001)). On the other hand, recall γ as in (5.14) and exploit that
W (τr)−sup0≤u≤τr W (u) is independent of sup0≤u≤τr W (u) (see, e.g., Theorem VI.5(i) in Bertoin
(1996)) and that W (τr)− sup0≤u≤τr W (u) has the same distribution as inf0≤u≤τr W (u) (Duality
Theorem) to find
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtEx(t)γ(t)dt
]
=
1
rA
(
α+ β
α
)− 1
1−α
E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rte−
σα
1−α
W (t)e
− σαβ
(1−α)(1−α−β)
inf0≤u≤tW (u)dt
]
=
1
rA
(
α+ β
α
)− 1
1−α
E
[
e
σα
1−α
[W˜ (τr))−sup0≤u≤τr W˜ (u)]e
σα
1−α−β
sup0≤u≤τr W˜ (u)
]
=
1
rA
(
α+ β
α
)− 1
1−α
E
[
e
σα
1−α
inf0≤u≤τr W˜ (u)
]
E
[
e
σα
1−α−β
sup0≤u≤τr W˜ (u)
]
=
1
rA
(
α+ β
α
)− 1
1−α
[ √
2r√
2r + σα1−α
][ √
2r√
2r − σα1−α−β
]
,
where we have used once more sup0≤s≤τr W˜ (s) ∼ Exp(
√
2r). Also, setting δ := βα
(
α+β
α
)− 1
1−α
we have
A = E
[∫ ∞
0
δ e−rt inf
0≤s≤t
E−
α
1−α
x (t− s) dt
]
=
δ
r
E
[
e−
σα
1−α
sup0≤s≤τr W (τr−s)
]
=
δ
r
E
[
e−
σα
1−α
sup0≤s′≤τr W (s
′)
]
=
δ
r
[ √
2r√
2r + σα1−α
]
.
Therefore
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtEx(t)γ(t)dt
]
=
α
β
[ √
2r√
2r − σα1−α−β
]
. (5.23)
Finally, by plugging (5.22) and (5.23) into (5.21), some simple algebra leads to (5.20).
We observe that the ratio Cˆ/C∗, the underprovision of the public good due to free-riding,
does not depend on σ, the volatility of the Brownian motion W . Thus, in our model
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Corollary 5.6. The degree of free-riding does not depend on the level of uncertainty.
This seems to be in contrast to the finding of other models in the economic literature in
which it is shown that uncertainty may play some role in the free rider effect (cf. Austen-Smith
(1980), Eichberger and Kelsey (1999) and Wang and Ewald (2010), among others).
5.2 Free Rider Effect: The Role of Irreversibility of Public Good Contribu-
tions
As in Proposition 5.5 assume ψc(t) = e
−rt and ψx(t) = e
−rtEx(t) ≡ e−rt+σW (t), σ > 0, for a
one-dimensional Brownian motion W and for some r such that
√
2r > σα1−α−β . We now study
the role played by irreversibility of the public good contributions (i.e. by the fact that these are
monotone controls, possibly singular with respect to Lebesgue measure as functions of time) in
the free rider effect. Given initial wealths wi = wo, i = 1, . . . , n, define the nonempty, convex
sets
Swo :=
{
(xi, ci) : Ω× [0, T ] 7→ R2+ optional, s.t.
E
[∫ T
0
ψx(t)x
i(t)dt+ r
∫ T
0
ψc(t)c
i(t)dt
]
≤ wo
}
.
(5.24)
and
Snwo :=
{
(x, c) : Ω× [0, T ] 7→ R2n+ optional, s.t.
n∑
i=1
E
[∫ T
0
ψx(t)x
i(t)dt+ r
∫ T
0
ψc(t)c
i(t)dt
]
≤ nwo
}
.
(5.25)
Notice that, differently to (2.2) and (3.1), in these two sets we do not require anymore the
public good provisions to be monotone processes, possibly singular with respect to the Lebesgue
measure (as functions of time). We have indeed here that the cumulative investment made up
to time t, Ci(t), satisfies dCi(t) = ci(t)dt.
Consider now the social planner problem and the public good contribution game (cf. Section
3 and Section 4) when, however, the social planner picks her investment strategies from the set
Snwo and agents from the set Swo ; that is, they face the optimal control problems
vSP := sup
(x,c)∈Snwo
n∑
i=1
γiU i(xi, ci; c−i)
and
vi(c−i) := sup
(xi,ci)∈Swo
U i(xi, ci; c−i), i = 1, . . . , n.
Finally, we denote by (x∗, c∗) the optimal policy of the social planner and, similarly to Definition
(4.1), we say
Definition 5.7. (xˆ1, . . . , xˆn, cˆ1, . . . , cˆn) is a Nash equilibrium if for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (xˆi, cˆi) ∈
Swo and U i(xˆi, cˆi, cˆ−i) = vi(cˆ−i).
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Economically, taking public good contributions in the set Swo or Snwo , we are assuming
perfect reversibility of C; i.e., each agent can adjust contribution in the public good freely at
every point of time.
Proposition 5.8. Under the same assumptions of Proposition 5.5, one has
cˆ(t)
c∗(t)
=
α+ β
nα+ β
(5.26)
for any n ≥ 1.
Proof. Employing arguments similar to those in the proof of Proposition 3.3 (but now only
with classical controls) one can show that the first-order conditions for optimality in the social
planner’s problem read P ⊗ dt-a.e.9
α
α+ β
(xi∗)
α−1(t)cβ∗ (t) = λ∗nEx(t),
β
α+ β
(xi∗)
α(t)cβ−1∗ (t) = λ∗r,
E
[∫ ∞
0
ψx(t)
n∑
i=1
xi∗(t) dt+ r
∫ ∞
0
e−rtc∗(t) dt
]
= nwo,
(5.27)
which are always binding because the Cobb-Douglas utility satisfies Inada conditions in both
variables. On the other hand, for the Nash equilibrium they are P ⊗ dt-a.e.
α
α+ β
(xˆi)α−1(t)cˆβ(t) = λˆEx(t),
β
α+ β
(xˆi)α(t)cˆβ−1(t) = λˆr,
E
[∫ ∞
0
ψx(t)xˆ
i(t) dt+ r
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
1
n
cˆ(t) dt
]
= wo.
(5.28)
By solving systems (5.27) and (5.28) one easily obtains
xi∗(t) =
(
rα
β
)[
λ∗
(
α+ β
α
)(
rα
β
)1−α ]− 1
1−α−β
(nEx(t))−
(1−β)
1−α−β ,
c∗(t) =
[
λ∗
(
α+ β
α
)(
rα
β
)1−α ]− 1
1−α−β
(nEx(t))−
α
1−α−β ,
λ
− 1
1−α−β
∗ =
nwo
rn−
α
1−α−β
(
α+β
β
) [(
rα
β
)1−α (
α+β
α
) ]− 1
1−α−β
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtE−
α
1−α−β
x (t) dt
] ,
9Notice that such a result is in line with the well known finding from the economic literature (see, e.g., Jorgenson
(1963)) that under perfect reversibility the optimal investment criterion is to equate the marginal operating profit
with the user cost of capital.
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and
xˆi(t) =
(
rα
β
)[
λˆ
(
α+ β
α
)(
rα
β
)1−α ]− 1
1−α−β E−
(1−β)
1−α−β
x (t),
cˆ(t) =
[
λˆ
(
α+ β
α
)(
rα
β
)1−α ]− 1
1−α−β E−
α
1−α−β
x (t),
λˆ−
1
1−α−β =
nwo
rn
− α
1−α−β
(
nα+β
nβ
) [(
rα
β
)1−α (
α+β
α
)− 1
1−α−β
]− 1
1−α−β
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtE−
α
1−α−β
x (t) dt
] ,
with E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtE−
α
1−α−β
x (t) dt
]
<∞ since √2r > σα1−α−β . Then (5.26) easily follows.
Comparing (5.20) and (5.26) one is then left with the following result.
Corollary 5.9. One has
Cˆ(t)
C∗(t)
=
cˆ(t)
c∗(t)
≤ 1.
That is, irreversibility of the public good contributions does not influence the degree of free-riding.
In conclusion, we have shown that in our model, for a symmetric economy with Cobb-Douglas
utilities, the degree of underprovision of the public good due to free-riding does not depend on
irreversibility of the public good contributions or the level of uncertainty, when the latter is
given by an exogenous one-dimensional Brownian motion. This interesting conclusion sheds
new light on the old economic problem of public good contribution showing that irreversibility
and uncertainty not necessarily mitigate the degree of free riding.
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A Some Proofs and Technical Results
A.1 On the Proof of Proposition 3.3
In this section we prove Proposition 3.3. The proof is a generalization of Theorem 3.2 in
Bank and Riedel (2001) to the case of a multivariate optimal consumption problem with both
monotone and classical absolutely continuous controls. Sufficiency easily follows from concavity
of the utility functions ui, i = 1, . . . , n. On the other hand, the next Lemma accomplishes the
proof of the necessity part. Necessity is proved by linearizing the original problem (3.2) around
its optimal solution (x∗, C∗), by showing that (x∗, C∗) solves the linearized problem as well and
that it satisfies some flat-off conditions as those of (3.8).
Recall the notation x :=
∑n
i=1 x
i and C :=
∑n
i=1 C
i.
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Lemma A.1. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and (x∗, C∗) ∈ Bw be optimal for problem (3.2)
and set
Ψ∗(t) := E
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
0 r(u) du
n∑
i=1
γi uic(x
i
∗(s), C∗(s)) ds
∣∣∣Ft]. (A-1)
Then (x∗, C∗)
i. solves the linear optimization problem
sup
(x,C)∈Bw
E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s)ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))x
i(t)dt+
∫ T
0
Ψ∗(t)dC(t)
]
; (A-2)
ii. satisfies
(
e−
∫ t
0 r(s)dsγiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))−Mψx(t)
)
xi∗(t) = 0 P ⊗ dt-a.e., i = 1, . . . , n,
E
[∫ T
0
(
Ψ∗(t)−Mψc(t)
)
dC∗(t)
]
= 0,
(A-3)
with
M := (P ⊗ dt)- ess sup
[
max
{
e−
∫ t
0
r(s)dsγiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))
ψx(t)
; i = 1, . . . , n
}]
∨ P - ess sup
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
Ψ∗(t)
ψc(t)
]
. (A-4)
Proof. The proof splits into two steps.
Step 1. Let (x∗, C∗) ∈ Bw be optimal for problem (3.2). For (x,C) ∈ Bw and ǫ ∈ [0, 1],
define the admissible strategy (xǫ, Cǫ) with xǫ(t) := ǫx(t) + (1 − ǫ)x∗(t) and such that Cǫ(t) =
ǫC(t)+ (1− ǫ)C∗(t). Notice that xǫ(t) and Cǫ(t) respectively converge to x∗(t) and C∗(t) for all
t ∈ [0, T ] a.s. when ǫ ↓ 0. Now, optimality of (x∗, C∗), Assumption 1.ii, concavity of ui and an
application of Fubini’s Theorem allow us to write
0 ≥ 1
ǫ
[USP (xǫ, Cǫ)− USP (x∗, C∗)]
≥ E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0
r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
ǫ(t), Cǫ(t))(x
i(t)− xi∗(t)) dt
]
+E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuic(x
i
ǫ(t), Cǫ(t))(C(t) − C∗(t)) dt
]
(A-5)
= E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
ǫ(t), Cǫ(t))(x
i(t)− xi∗(t)) dt
]
+E
[∫ T
0
Φǫ(t)(dC(t)− dC∗(t))
]
,
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where Φǫ(t) :=
∫ T
t e
−
∫ s
0
r(u) du∑n
i=1 γ
i uic(x
i
ǫ(s), Cǫ(s)) ds. One has
lim inf
ǫ↓0
E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
ǫ(t), Cǫ(t))x
i(t)dt
]
≥ E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))x
i(t)dt
]
and
lim inf
ǫ↓0
E
[∫ T
0
Φǫ(t)dC(t)
]
≥ E
[∫ T
0
Φ∗(t)dC(t)
]
,
with Φ∗ := Φ0, by Fatou’s Lemma. We now claim (and we prove it later) that
lim
ǫ↓0
E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0
r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
ǫ(t), Cǫ(t))x
i
∗(t)dt
]
(A-6)
= E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0
r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))x
i
∗(t)dt
]
and
lim
ǫ↓0
E
[∫ T
0
Φǫ(t)dC∗(t)
]
= E
[∫ T
0
Φ∗(t)dC∗(t)
]
. (A-7)
Hence from (A-5)
E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))x
i(t) dt
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
Φ∗(t)dC(t)
]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))x
i
∗(t) dt
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
Φ∗(t)dC∗(t)
]
and by replacing Φ∗ with its optional projection Ψ∗ as defined in (A-1) (cf. Jacod (1979),
Theorem 1.33) it follows that (x∗, C∗) is optimal for problem (A-2) as well.
To conclude the proof we must prove (A-6) and (A-7). To prove (A-6) it suffices to show
that the family (Γ1ǫ )ǫ∈[0, 1
2
] given by
Γ1ǫ(t) := e
−
∫ t
0
r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
ǫ(t), Cǫ(t))x
i
∗(t)
is P ⊗dt-uniformly integrable. Concavity of ui and the fact that xiǫ(t) ≥ 12xi∗(t) a.s. for ǫ ∈ [0, 12 ]
and every t ∈ [0, T ] lead to
Γ1ǫ(t) ≤ 2e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
ǫ(t), Cǫ(t))x
i
ǫ(t) ≤ 2e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γi
[
ui(xiǫ(t), Cǫ(t))−ui(0, Cǫ(t))
]
,
and the last term in the right-hand side above is P ⊗ dt-uniformly integrable by Assumption
1.ii. Then (A-6) holds by Vitali’s Convergence Theorem.
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As for (A-7) note that by Fubini’s Theorem∫ T
0
Φǫ(t)dC∗(t) =
∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuic(x
i
ǫ(t), Cǫ(t))C∗(t)dt.
Hence, to have (A-7) it suffices to show that the family
Γ2ǫ(t) := e
−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuic(x
i
ǫ(t), Cǫ(t))C∗(t)
is P ⊗ dt-uniformly integrable, but this follows by employing arguments similar to those used
for (Γ1ǫ)ǫ∈[0, 1
2
].
Step 2. We now show that the flat-off conditions (A-3) hold for any solution (xˆ, Cˆ) of the
linear problem (A-2). Then, by Step 1, they also hold for (x∗, C∗).
Notice that for every (x,C) ∈ Bw one has
E
[∫ T
0
n∑
i=1
e−
∫ t
0 r(s)dsγiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))x
i(t)dt+
∫ T
0
Ψ∗(t)dC(t)
]
≤ME
[∫ T
0
n∑
i=1
ψx(t)x
i(t)dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dC(t)
]
=Mw (A-8)
by definition of M (cf. (A-4)). Obviously, if (x,C) satisfies (A-3) we then have equality in (A-8).
On the other hand, if
sup
(x,C)∈Bw
E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s)ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))x
i(t)dt+
∫ T
0
Ψ∗(t)dC(t)
]
=Mw, (A-9)
then equality holds through (A-8) and we obtain (A-3).
It therefore remains to prove (A-9). To this end take K < M and define the investment
strategies
xiK(t) :=
{
α if e−
∫ t
0
r(s)dsγiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t)) ≥ Kψx(t),
0 else
and CK(t) := α1[σK ,T ](t),
with the stopping time
σK := inf{t ∈ [0, T ) : Ψ∗(t) ≥ Kψc(t)} ∧ T
and some α such that E[
∫ T
0
∑n
i=1 ψx(t)x
i
K(t)dt+
∫ T
0 ψc(t)dCK(t)] = w. Note that one can find
such α. Indeed, suppose to the contrary that for α = 1, max{xiK(t); i = 1, ..., n} = CK(t) = 0 on
[0, T ) P ⊗ dt-a.e. for some K > 0. This would mean M ≤ K by the definition of M (cf. (A-4)).
Continuous-Time Public Good Contribution 34
We now have
Mw ≥ sup
(x,C)∈Bw
E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0
r(s)ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))x
i(t)dt+
∫ T
0
Ψ∗(t)dC(t)
]
≥ E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s)ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))x
i
K(t)dt+
∫ T
0
Ψ∗(t)dCK(t)
]
≥ K E
[∫ T
0
n∑
i=1
ψx(t)x
i
K(t)dt+ αψc(σK)1{σK<T}
]
≥ K E
[∫ T
0
n∑
i=1
ψx(t)x
i
K(t)dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dCK(t)
]
= Kw,
which yields (A-9) by letting K ↑M .
We are now able to prove Proposition 3.3.
Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof. Sufficiency follows from concavity of utility function ui, i = 1, . . . , n, (cf. Assumption 1).
Indeed, for (x∗, C∗) ∈ Bw satisfying (3.8) and for (x,C) any other admissible policy we may
write
USP (x∗, C∗)− USP (x,C) ≥E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s)ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))(x
i
∗(t)− xi(t))dt
]
+E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0
r(s)ds
n∑
i=1
γiuic(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))(C∗(t)− C(t))dt
]
=E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0
r(s)ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))(x
i
∗(t)− xi(t))dt
]
+E
[∫ T
0
(∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
0 r(u) du
n∑
i=1
γiuic(x
i
∗(s), C∗(s)) ds
)
(dC∗(t)− dC(t))
]
≥λ(w − w) = 0,
where (3.8) and Fubini’s Theorem lead to the second inequality, whereas the last one is implied
by the first and the fourth of (3.8) and by the budget constraint. Finally, Lemma A.1 yields the
proof of the necessity part.
A.2 A Useful Simple Lemma
Lemma A.2. Let Assumption 1 hold and set hi(ψ, c) := uic(g(ψ, c), c) for every i = 1, . . . , n,
ψ, c > 0, where gi(·, c) is the inverse of uix(·, c). Then c 7→ hi(ψ, c) is strictly decreasing for any
ψ > 0. Moreover, if also uxc ≥ 0, then ψ 7→ h(ψ, c) is nonincreasing for any c > 0.
Proof. hi is strictly decreasing in c by strict concavity of ui. Indeed, since uix(g
i(ψ, c), c) = ψ is
constant in c for all ψ > 0, by implicit differentiation gic(ψ, c) = −uixc(gi(ψ, c), c)/uixx(gi(ψ, c), c).
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Then hic(ψ, c) = u
i
xc(g
i(ψ, c), c)gic(ψ, c) + u
i
cc(g
i(ψ, c), c) = −[uixc(gi(ψ, c), c)]2/uixx(gi(ψ, c), c) +
uicc(g
i(ψ, c), c) < 0, as the Hessian of ui is negative definite by Assumption 1.i.
On the other hand, h(ψ, c) = uc(g(ψ, c), c) is nonincreasing in ψ if also uxc ≥ 0, since g(·, c)
is strictly decreasing like ux(·, c), which it is the inverse of.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3.4
Proof. For any given λ > 0, set X(t) := λψc(t)1{t<T}. Such a process vanishes at T , it is of
class (D) and lower semicontinuous in expectation by Assumption 2. Moreover, we define the
atomless, optional random Borel measure µ(ω, dt) := e−
∫ t
0
r(ω,s)dsdt and the random field
f i(ω, t, ℓ) :=
{
hi( λ
γi
e
∫ t
0
r(ω,s)dsψx(ω, t),−1ℓ ) if ℓ < 0,
−ℓ if ℓ ≥ 0,
for some γi > 0. Notice that (ω, t) 7→ f i(ω, t, ℓ) is progressively measurable and P ⊗ µ(dt)
integrable for any given and fixed ℓ ∈ R. Moreover, since c 7→ hi(ψ, c) is strictly decreasing (cf.
Lemma A.2) and, by assumption, satisfies the Inada conditions
lim
c↓0
hi(ψ, c) = +∞, lim
c↑∞
hi(ψ, c) = 0, (A-10)
then f i(ω, t, ·) is strictly decreasing from +∞ to −∞. All these properties are clearly inherited
by the function
∑n
i=1 γ
ihi(ψ, ·), being γi > 0, i = 1, . . . , n.
Following the arguments, e.g., in the proof of Proposition 3.4 of Ferrari (2015) (see also the
proof of Theorem 2.4 in Bank and Riedel (2003)), we can apply Theorem 3 of Bank and El Karoui
(2004) to have existence of an optional signal process l∗ solving (3.11). Such a process is also up-
per right-continuous and therefore it is unique up to indistinguishability by Bank and El Karoui
(2004), Theorem 1, and Meyer’s optional section theorem (see, e.g., Dellacherie and Meyer
(1978), Theorem IV.86) (cf. again Ferrari (2015), proof of Proposition 3.4, or Bank and Ku¨chler
(2007), proof of Theorem 1).
A.4 Proof of Proposition 5.4
Due to Theorem 4.4, to find the Nash equilibrium strategy of the public good contribution game
(4.1) in our homogeneous and symmetric setting it suffices to solve backward equation (4.9).
Recall that hi(ψ, c) := uic(g
i(ψ, c), c) with gi(·, c) the inverse of uix(·, c). For any λi > 0,
straightforward computations lead to hi(λiertψx(t), C(t)) = δ(λ
iEx(t))
α
α−1C
α+β−1
1−α (t), with δ :=
β
α
(
α+β
α
) 1
α−1
. Set Cˆi(t) = sup0≤s≤t lˆ(s) ∨ 0 for some progressively measurable process lˆ solving
E
[∫ ∞
τ
δe−rs(λiEx(s))
α
α−1
(
n sup
τ≤u≤s
lˆ(u)
)α+β−1
1−α
ds
∣∣∣∣ Fτ] = λie−rτEc(τ),
i.e.,
E
[∫ ∞
0
δe−ru(λi)
α
α−1
Ex
α
α−1 (u+ τ)
Ec(τ) inf0≤s≤u
(
(nlˆ)
α+β−1
1−α (s+ τ)
)
du
∣∣∣∣ Fτ] = λi. (A-11)
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Now take lˆ(t) := κnEc
1−α
α+β−1 (t)Ex
α
α+β−1 (t) for some constant κ and use independence and station-
arity of Le´vy increments to rewrite (A-11) as
κ
α+β−1
1−α E
[∫ ∞
0
δe−ru inf
0≤s≤u
(
Ec(s)E
α
α−1
x (u− s)
)
du
]
= (λi)
1
1−α . (A-12)
We claim (and we discuss later) that (cf. (5.17))A := E[
∫∞
0 δe
−ru inf0≤s≤u
(
Ec(s)E
− α
1−α
x (u− s)
)
du]
is finite. Then by solving (A-12) for λi one obtains
λi = A1−ακα+β−1 =: λˆi.
But now xˆi(t) = [λˆi
(
α+β
α
)
Ex(t)Cˆ−β(t)]
1
α−1 , and therefore
xˆi(t) = (λˆi)−
1
1−α
[(
α+ β
α
)
Ex(t)κ−β inf
0≤s≤t
(
E
β(1−α)
1−α−β
c (s)E
αβ
1−α−β
x (s)
)]− 1
1−α
;
that is,
xˆi(t) = κγ(t) (A-13)
with γ(t) as in (5.14).
To determine κ we use the budget constraint E[
∫∞
0 ψx(t)xˆ
i(t)dt +
∫∞
0 ψc(t)dCˆ
i(t)] = w.
Indeed, by (A-13) we have
κE
[∫ ∞
0
ψx(t)γ(t)dt+
1
n
∫ ∞
0
ψc(t)dθ(t)
]
= w, (A-14)
since Cˆi(t) = sup0≤s≤t lˆ(s) =
κ
n sup0≤s≤t(E
− 1−α
1−α−β
c (s)E
− α
1−α−β
x (s)) =
κ
nθ(t) with θ(t) as in (5.15),
and if E[
∫∞
0 ψx(t)γ(t)dt+
1
n
∫∞
0 ψc(t)dθ(t)] <∞. Now the result follows by solving (A-14) for κ.
Finally, arguments as those in the proof of Proposition 5.3 allow to show that under Assumption
3.4. all the quantities above are finite, thus completing the proof.
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